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A Nordic proverb tells us that a prudent man does not make the goat his gardener. 
But that is exactly what we have done. In the garden of Europe we have handed 
over power to the goat of transnational companies and banks and to democratically 
weakly accountable bureaucrats. The harvest we have reaped is the euro-crisis. I 
will first present the basic features of what I consider to be the standard view of the 
political situation in Europe. In the discussion that follows I will try to show that the 
standard view has made us complicit in empowering the goat. When we see this 
clearly – what has happened and why it has happened – it will also be relatively 
easy to agree on responses to the crisis. But clarity of vision is, as we shall see, in 
this case somewhat hard to attain.
I. The standard view
In an interview given to the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in the spring 
of 2013, the American philosopher and social theorist Nancy Fraser said:
So there’s a mismatch in scale between Europe as a political unit and Europe as an 
economic unit and that’s already bad enough but then you plug it into this worldwide 
context where essentially private economic powers have wildly outstripped the public 
political powers at all levels. We don’t have the capacity to develop for example global 
financial regulation that could prevent the bond markets dictating to states what they 
can do, how much they can spend on social programmes and so on. This is a deeply 
undemocratic situation, and I think the only way to resolve it is to scale up political 
power in a democratic way to cope with this huge runaway of economic and financial 
power. I think the challenges are really enormous and Europe’s situation is part of a 
much bigger set of problems.1 
1  Sadinmaa, A. 2013. 
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In a recent book, Jürgen Habermas writes:
Den darauf folgenden Zeit-Aufsatz (II.) habe ich in Reaktion auf jene historische 
Nachtsitzung vom 7. zum 8. Mai 2010 geschrieben, in der Angela Merkel von 
der Gewalt der Finanzmärkte eingeholt wurde. Sie hatte die Proportionen 
zwischen der unausweichlichen Hilfe für das überschuldete Griechenland und 
der opportunistischen Rücksichtnahme auf das innenpolitische Klein-Klein (der 
ohnehin verlorenen Landtagswahl in Nordrhein-Westfalen) verkannt und musste 
sich nach langen Wochen des Zögerns den immer kostspieligeren Imperativen des 
Marktes kleinlaut unterwerfen. Damals ist mir zum ersten Mal die reale Möglichkeit 
eines Scheiterns des europäischen Projektes zu Bewusstsein gekommen.2 
These quotes together express well the basic features of what I believe is a 
politically influential view that is widely shared by citizens in Europe; most typically 
by intellectuals that identify with the social-liberal, green or left end of the spectrum 
of politics. I will call this view the standard view. It has three basic pillars. We need 
transnational political instruments as a counter-weight to the transnational power of 
the markets.3 There is a European project that serves this purpose. This European 
project is in a crisis.4
Now, as I indicated, it appears to me that in their eagerness to tame globalised 
market-forces politically, people who accept the standard view have accepted 
empowerment of the European Union as it is today. In so doing they have turned 
a blind eye to the fact that the European union is a deeply undemocratic institution 
with neo-liberal policies at its heart. The eagerness is understandable because 
there is so much truth in the standard view. It seems clear to the present author 
that a democratic and strong European Union would be a very good thing to have, 
2  Habermas 2011. 
3  In this essay, I will use the word “transnational” as a broad concept whose meaning also 
encompasses most of the usual meanings of “global” and “post-national.” Distinctions between 
these terms will be introduced when there is a specific need.
4 My characterisation of the standard view is broad. It will be easy for anyone who disagrees with 
my arguments against it below to go back and say that if we introduce some more precision to my 
characterisation of the standard view we can arrive at varieties of the standard view that are not 
vulnerable to my criticism. But I invite people to consider whether this kind of reaction may not be 
a case where Hegel’s dictum that “fear of error may be fear of the truth” applies. As Richard Rorty 
well knew: whenever you are trapped in a discussion, you can get out of the trap by introducing a 
distinction. For those who want to do so, it will always be possible to use Rorty’s advice to distinguish 
themselves from my characterisation of the standard view and to claim that my criticism of it does 
not affect them. But I submit that such manoeuvres will mostly not promote truth. I call on the 
generosity of the reader to consider the possibility that I may be more in the right than in the wrong 
when I say this.
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exactly for the reasons that form the theoretical nucleus of the standard view.5 But 
the questions we must ask are: Do we have this Union today? If not, are we getting 
closer to it now? If, again, the answer is negative, do we have good reason to 
believe that we can achieve it tomorrow or the day after tomorrow? If the answers 
to all these questions is negative, as indeed they may be, we make a mistake of 
historical magnitude if we think, that because of the element of truth in the standard 
view, we need to be loyal to the present European Union. The failure to consider 
this possibility in earnest is the rotten heart of the standard view.
Some people will think that my critical view of this standard view is mistaken, 
and that it is me, not they, who are making a politically dangerous mistake. They 
may say that if we start compromising on the standard view and the commitments 
to post-national aspirations and strategies that flow from it we will easily find 
ourselves in the same camp with reactionary nationalist, xenophobic and fascist 
forces.
I shall try to show that this tendency – the tendency to insulate the standard 
view from critical questioning – leads us wrong. It makes it unnecessarily difficult to 
see that it will be liberating for our political imagination and work if we can think of 
other counter-weights to the transnational power of the markets than transnational 
political instruments. This liberation can only be achieved if we first agree to take a 
reflective view on the idea of a “European project” and its crisis.
Here, I will pause for some preparatory remarks about concepts and the scope 
of my discussion.
First, the common goal of people who subscribe to the standard view is 
cosmopolitanism. I also think of myself as a “cosmopolitan.”6 Second, I will not be 
concerned with explaining myself to people who do not share the cosmopolitan 
ambition. Third, I will not examine critically or self-critically the assumption that 
5 I am, since many years, a supporter of what we may call the obvious political proposal for 
a democratisation of the European Union in two steps. First we have a democratically formed 
constitutional assembly. (It can be formed through direct elections for this purpose or in other ways.) 
Next, its proposals for a new democratic European Union are brought to referenda. There can be 
national referenda and the European Union will be “re-constituted” if a proposal gathers “double-
majority”, that is, a majority of EU-citizens and in a majority of member states. Nations that have had 
majorities against would be allowed to vote again about joining in the light of the result of the first 
round. If this way forward is closed there are also other things we can do to promote democratisation 
of the European Union. We may campaign for a more social Euopean Union, by making a strong 
social protocol a part of the EU constitution, by reforming labour regulation, by introducing new bank 
regulation etc. Similarly, Cameron’s suggestion that Britain’s membership-conditions are redesigned 
on the basis of a plebiscite may be instrumentally motivated, but this should not prevent us from 
recognising its inherent democratic value. All that is fine, as far as it goes: But the question we must 
always consider is: Are we getting anywhere closer to what we want? If not, why? And what, then, 
are the other ideas, visions and proposals that we may need for a politics of freedom and solidarity 
in Europe today.
6 The concept “cosmopolitanism” is not very precise. I take it to mean simply a commitment to the 
search for a global polity, and, as a part of it, a European polity that can do better than we do today 
in terms of social justice, democracy and responsibility for the environment, locally, regionally and 
globally, both in the short term and in the long term. For current purposes “cosmopolitanism”, as just 
defined, is interchangeable with “ethical universalism”, a term I sometimes prefer.
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what we may loosely call market-fundamentalism and neo-liberalism are threats to 
cosmopolitanism rather than ways of promoting it.7 
What I offer is, then, intended as a contribution to a discussion within the family of 
those who are committed to the goal of promoting cosmopolitan futures for Europe 
and who are not believers in mainly market-driven ways of realising the goal. This 
”family” is my family. But as I already indicated, it seems to be an open question 
whether I myself belong to the family I describe as my family. This is a more difficult 
question to get right than one might expect. The difficulty has to do with the morally 
transformative power of argument and our difficulty with that power.8
In order to overcome the difficulties it is important not to move too quickly. I will 
begin with some observations about how my cosmopolitan family has responded 
to the crisis in the European Union, particularly in the euro-zone, since 2008.
II. The standard understanding of the crisis, the standard 
responses to it and some problems with those responses
The standard responses to the crisis coming from the cosmopolitan camp have 
been shaped by a widely shared standard view of its physiognomy. Here is my 
reconstruction of the main features of this standard understanding of the crisis in 
Europe:
(i) The crisis management by the EU-institutions has been built on the premise that 
the crisis is due to lax fiscal policies and the amassing of unsustainable levels 
of debt. 
(ii) The premise is mistaken. Even if there is, especially perhaps in the case of 
Greece, some truth in it, the more relevant and deeply correct diagnosis is 
that the euro-crisis is above all due to financialisation and to policies that grant 
financialised capitalism systemically destabilising privileges at the cost of 
social justice and ecological sustainability.
(iii) when the false diagnosis is replaced with the correct one we can also replace 
irrational policy responses with rational ones. 
(iv) on this basis we can come together and produce, with relative ease, a way out 
of the crisis.
7  I am a great believer in the beneficial role in society of free markets. But I will not here discuss 
why I think most policies promoted today in the name of market freedom are actually contrary to 
market freedom. On this see, for example, Honneth 2011, ch. III.2.
8 See Wallgren 2006.
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(v) proposals for constructive programmes typically maintain that the austerity 
measures and the European treaties and legislation that have been placed 
before us since 2009 to promote and enshrine this austerity of the last years 
need to be rejected or seriously reformed. In their place we need new monetary 
policies, new fiscal policies and new European institutional designs to back 
them.9
This narrative has overwhelming support on the social-liberal, green-left end 
of the spectrum of analysis and activism in which I find myself at home. There are 
of course differences on each point but these are differences within the family.10 
The most talked about difference is over the sustainability of the debt burden. 
Some cosmopolitans tend to accept the idea that the problem with the debt is 
such that central bank intervention and Keynesian anti-cyclical fiscal policies will 
not be sufficient and that there is a real need to combine this kind of measure 
with “structural reform” of the kind neo-liberals often say are the most important 
part of responsible crisis management. This difference stirs a lot of debate and, 
to the delight of the market-fundamentalists, is a fertile source of division among 
cosmopolitans.11 One purpose of the discussion that follows is to show that the 
debate about the issues mentioned here is not very important. In fact, it seems to 
me that there is a danger that discussion of these issues of economic policy stand 
in the way of discussing other issues that are fundamental and that when they have 
been resolved any outstanding issues in the area of economic policy can also be 
resolved with ease.
We can begin to shift interest in a more fruitful direction by looking at differences 
that sometimes arise about point (v). The debate is about the egg and the chicken. 
The egg all cosmopolitans want is a more socially responsible monetary and fiscal 
policy than the one that prevails today. But opinions differ over how to get the egg. 
Can and should we fight elections to win power in the institutions we already have 
or must we struggle to reform the chicken of the power structure first? What is 
the right balance between the two trajectories? These are pressing issues (and I, 
for one, would like us to put more weight than we usually do in the power reform 
basket). However, for reasons only hinted at so far, I am not optimistic about the 
9 See, for example, the information and links provided at <www.etuc.org/r/1704; <corporateeurope.
org/blog/stop-eus-antidemocratic-austerity-policies-different-europe>; <etuce.homestead.com/
ETUCE_Statements.html>; and <www.altersummit.eu>. (All internet sources in this article are 
accessed 8th Sept. 2013 unless mentioned otherwise.)
10 See, for example, the contribution by Costas Lapavitas at the conference “Dictatorship of 
Failure: The Economic and Political Crisis of Europe”, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Study, 
University of Helsinki, 15–16 November 2012, <youtu.be/4a8pTERRrPQ>. See also the information 
and links provided at <www.etuc.org/r/1704>; <corporateeurope.org/blog/stop-eus-antidemocratic-
austerity-policies-different-europe>; <etuce.homestead.com/ETUCE_Statements.html> and 
<www.altersummit.eu> and also, for example Patomäki 2013. 
11 In several countries, including France, the Netherlands and Finland, and more generally, in 
European discussion in left-wing circles, the debate over this issue often works as a dividing line 
between more “realistic” right-wing social-democrats and a more neo-Keynesian, “radical” left.
Wallgren
249
prospects for success coming from political analysis and action that is confined by 
the narrative I have outlined.
One reason is that the narrative outlined above in five steps suffers from a 
failure to unpack the notion of ”a” crisis that affects ”Europe” or ”our economies” 
that ”we” need to manage. What we may silently suspect, but have failed to put 
at the forefront of our struggles and debates, is that what we often refer to as the 
current crisis management is not an outcome of irrational efforts of misinformed 
actors.
There has rarely been, in times of peaceful reform, a transfer of money and 
power from the underprivileged to the privileged as rapid as that which has taken 
place in the euro-zone in 2009-2012. For the winners there is therefore no crisis at 
all. There is triumph on two fronts. So why not celebrate?
What I want to claim is not that cosmopolitans have not seen that for the 
winners there is no crisis. My claim is that there has been a strange distribution 
of attention in our discourse over the European Union during the past few years. 
Many cosmopolitans and perhaps the liberal press at large have tended to speak 
of a euro-crisis, and of time-pressure and failings in crisis management.
They have tended to be silent about the triumph by the few over the many. I also 
want to suggest that as long as the current distribution of attention prevails, that is, 
as long as we continue to speak of the crisis (rather than e.g. of ”their triumph, our 
crisis”), cosmopolitan political responses to the triumph of the strong over the weak 
is likely to remain unambitious and ineffective.
To illustrate this point let us look at just one example of the implications of 
different conceptual terrains and narratives for our political imagination. If we 
accept the double picture that we live in a time of triumph for some, not of crisis for 
all, it will, as I suggest, be natural to shift attention away from the struggle against 
austerity policies (a consequence of the current distribution of power) to a struggle 
against the disproportionate influence that corporate lobbyists and technocrats 
have in the formulation of those policies (the cause of austerity policies). It will also 
be more important for us to consider how we can break up the ”Too Big To Fail” 
banks (also called “systemic banks“) and change the role of the ECB, either by 
altering the quality of its mandate or by reducing its power, than it is to campaign 
for, for example, the financial transaction tax or to discuss details of the proposed 
banking union of the EU.12
Nevertheless, I do not propose the foregoing two points as a correct political 
agenda that should replace a false one. Surely, it would be quite nice if satisfactory 
responses to the current crisis of the many and triumph of the few could be 
achieved so easily. But things are not easy. The lessons at this point are smaller. 
The first lesson is a reminder that it still matters to our political self-understanding 
and dynamics what stories we tell. The second lesson is that the stories we tell are 
12 “Too Big To Fails” or “systemic banks” refer to private finance institutions the collapse of which 
may lead to unforeseeable and potentially chaotic consequences for economic actors across 
continents. 
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not only shaped by what we know but significantly also by how we place the things 
we know.13
The claim that a redistribution of wealth and resources from the poor to the rich 
has followed from the austerity imposed needs no elaboration here. The facts are 
on the table for everyone to see.14 But I want to turn attention to the other dimension 
of the triumph of the few, to the redistribution of power from the democratic polity 
to, let us say, ”the oligarchy.” My reason for doing so is not primarily to lament that 
as power flows to the oligarchy we may be likely to go from bad to worse in the 
plundering by the rich of common wealth. The reason is that there is, as I suggest, 
a curious, negative double bind between the standard view and the triumph of the 
few. 
The negative relation is not due to a failure of the democratic idealism of the 
cosmopolitans. The ideals are in impeccable order. But as I noted, cosmopolitans 
have not discussed much what has happened to these ideals as the European 
Union has evolved, nor have they asked what happens now. People have of course 
ever so often mentioned that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit. But there 
has been little analysis, that is, little effort to understand the deficit and hence, little 
discussion of how important it is or how to overcome it.
My suggestion is that the standard view is the explanatory factor if we want to 
understand why the democracy deficit has been relatively little discussed. It, the 
standard view, is part of us. It shapes and damages our political imagination in two 
ways. It has a utopian aspect that tilts our imagination in favour of transnational 
governance. As we have become used to the idea that the European Union serves 
the post-national needs of our times we are prone to think that when we strengthen 
this Union we are also taking real steps towards our utopia. The second damage to 
our political imagination and hierarchy of attention follows from the first. Our prior 
13 On policy options: Of course, it may be, as of today, that after giving up the notion of “the 
euro-crisis” in favour of more differentiating terms, we may still end up rallying against austerity, 
campaigning for the financial transaction tax and calling the shots at national governments. But 
the arguments for doing so, and, hence, the political agenda of which these actions are a part, will 
change even if and when the current activities remain the same as before in the short term.
14 With unemployment rates especially in the southern part of the euro-zone rising rapidly and 
with youth unemployment at catastrophic levels, with harsh cuts in pensions and welfare benefits in 
the crisis countries, with forced sell-off of public assets at crisis prices and with the easy transfer of 
profits and wealth to jurisdictions with practically no tax, the widening of the gap between rich and 
poor in narrowly economic terms is not debatable even if the lack of transparency in the tax and 
finance systems make it difficult to obtain exact figures about some of the most relevant indicators. 
The difficulties include, for instance, the difficulty of tracking the destiny and distributive effects of 
the extremely cheap money that has since 2008 been handed over, in quantities of some trillion 
(million millions) euros, by the ECB and European governments to the commercial banks – and 
of estimating exactly the economic gains amassed by the richest 1 %. For overall statistics on 
income distribution in the European Union, with some analysis, see <epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
statistics_explained/index.php/Income_distribution_statistics#>. For wage development in the EU, 
see <www.etui.org/Topics/Crisis/Wage-development-infographic>. For data on child poverty, see 
<epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-13-004/EN/KS-SF-13-004-EN.PDF>. 
For data on unemployment, see <epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-30082013-
AP/EN/3-30082013-AP-EN.PDF>. For the development of the so called gini-coefficient, see, for 
example, <epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tessi1
90&plugin=0> For estimates of wealth stocked away in tax havens, see e.g. <www.taxjustice.net/
cms/front_content.php?idcat=148>.
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commitments make us rather willing – more willing than is good for us– to brush 
aside concern about the democratic quality of our success.
As a remedy, I suggest three steps. The first step is to attend to what has been 
brushed aside. This means going from the abstract notion that the European Union 
suffers from a democratic deficit to a concrete explanation of what this means, 
that is, to a real discussion of the state of democracy in the European Union. The 
second step is to draw lessons from the first step. As we try to do so, we will 
discover a need to look self-critically at the standard view. The third step is to 
engage in this self-critical exercise. It will involve above all, a questioning of some 
of the underlying presuppositions that have, inadvertently, contributed to making 
the standard view attractive in the first place. These three steps define the road-
map for the rest of this essay. 
The first step is intellectually a straightforward affair. But we will see that morally 
it is a difficult step to take. In fact the step is so difficult, that cosmopolitans usually 
find it almost impossible not to step back as soon as they see where it takes them. 
This is why I must warn the reader that as I invite her, my cosmopolitan colleague, 
to read on she may find herself reluctant to do so. There will be a reluctance at four 
levels. 
Her first level of reluctance is the one noted before. It is her reluctance to analyse 
the evolution and state of democracy in the European Union. Her second level of 
reluctance is her reluctance to look neutrally, without fear, at individual steps of the 
analysis. Her third level of reluctance is her reluctance to accept the outcome of 
the analysis if it is very negative. Her fourth level of reluctance is her reluctance to 
admit her reluctance. 
All these levels are intertwined. They are in fact, different aspects of one 
phenomenon: the phenomenon is the moral and emotional attachment that people 
have to the standard view. For many of us the standard view has become an 
identity marker. We feel pride in belonging to an avant-garde elite defined by the 
standard view. The standard view also works as a source of social prestige and for 
many it has played an essential role in shaping careers: In both academic studies 
and public debate and action ample rewards have, since around 1990, been on 
offer to those who have committed themselves to the standard view. An additional 
source of irrational attachment to the standard view is that we fear that if we give 
it up politics will become even more difficult than we ever imagined and hope, too, 
becomes more difficult to sustain than we ever imagined. 
All these factors that explain our attachment to the standard view work also as 
sources of our will. If the standard view shapes how we see things, these sources 
of our attachment to the standard view shape how we want to see things. As such 
they make us prone to reject views that undermine the standard view.
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III. Why we should have expected the crisis: 
The origins and evolution of the so-called 
democracy deficit in the European Union
Between the 1950s and 2008, institutional design anchored in explicit post-national 
legal reform was the core element in the build-up of the European Economic 
Community and other institutions that have later been brought together under one 
umbrella in the current European Union. This mechanism of formally agreed juridical 
integration still plays a role, as can be seen in the so-called six-pack and the TSCG-
treaty.15 But during the past few years we have seen the rise of what Habermas 
calls “executive federalism” and of what we might also call the rise of soft power 
to the centre of the polity. The relevant new phenomenon is the redistribution of 
regulatory power from the constitutional sphere to the extra-constitutional sphere: 
increasingly, the preferred mechanism for the implementation of policy reforms in 
EU-institutions and in member-states is through decrees based on agreement that 
come from closed cabinet meetings and whose compatibility with the European 
constitution and national constitutions is obscure. In other words, we live in times 
of an attack that strikes at the heart of the rule of law, that is, on the notion that the 
exercise of political authority should have a basis in law and be limited by law.16
It was perhaps always like that European integration has always partly leaped 
forward through political agreement first, which has then, with or without real efforts 
to involve the citizens and give them a say, been followed by belated constitutional 
reform or treaty reform.17 But the extent to which politics has moved beyond 
constitutionality and the speed of the change is, arguably, new.
I will next discuss these general trends in some more detail. I first present an 
overview over how the democracy deficit in the European Union evolved from the 
1950s up to the Lisbon treaty (Democracy in Europe 1950-2007).18 I then turn to 
some observations about the last ten years and about the standard responses to it 
(Democracy in Europe 2003-2013).
15 The six-pack is EU-slang for a set of regulations of macroeconomic surveillance of member 
states by the commission that was adopted in the summer of 2011 and entered into force in December 
2011. The TSCG is the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union, also referred to as the Fiscal Compact, the Fiscal Stability Treaty or the Austerity 
Treaty. It is an intergovernmental treaty open to EU-members signed on 2 March 2012. (The British 
veto prevented incorporating the TSCG into EU legislation.) It entered into force on 1 January 2013 
for the sixteen states which completed ratification prior to this date.
16 For Habermas’s use of the term “executive federalism”, see his Habermas 2011. Arguably, a 
major driver in the shift towards executive federalism is the domestic power-battle in Germany. 
There the constitutional court seated at Karlsruhe has repeatedly imposed limits to Germany’s 
acceptance of juridically explicit transfer of budgetary power to the European Union. The response 
by the government has been, paradoxically, to impose its control of the budgets of other Euro-zone 
countries as a condition for its approval of the bail-out of banks exposed to the crisis of government 
debt in southern Europe. (See e.g. Watkins 2013.)
17 In this essay, I will sometimes speak, imprecisely, of the treaties of the European Union as a 
constitution. When more precise terminology is required it will be introduced.
18 Developments in the former Soviet-bloc will not considered. For some critical remarks on the 
political semantics of “Europe”, see fn below.
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3.1. Democracy in Europe 1950 - 2007
There is a widely shared sense that from the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 
1957 up to the signing of the draft constitution in 2003 European institutions have 
suffered from what has been called a “democracy deficit”. The problems were 
always well known. However, as the European Economic Community had relatively 
speaking far less significance than the European Union now has, the problems 
were, reasonably, often looked upon as ones to be addressed and solved later. 
This attitude of postponement is now, arguably, running into a crisis. In order 
to see why, we must first provide an overview of the most important problems 
(“democracy deficits”) as they appeared before the 2001-2007 round of enhanced 
constitutionalisation and then look at the recent changes. The first item in my 
overview is more controversial and also conceptually obscure than the other six, 
which are relatively straightforward and generally acknowledged.
First, in the Treaty of Rome the priority of so-called economic freedoms, that is, 
the freedom of movement of capital, goods, services and labour, were at the core. 
Later, as integration has “deepened”, that is, as the European Union has acquired 
ever-broader competencies, this core has been preserved. In consequence, the 
heritage from early modernity, in which equal political rights and civil freedoms 
of individuals were the basic pillar of the constitution, has been undermined. As 
EU-law has been inscribed as the top-level of the juridical hierarchy and as the 
constitutionalisation of the European Union has progressed a shift in the balance 
has followed between rights derived from two opposite sources. The balance has 
gradually tipped in favour of juridical rights defined in terms of the functional needs 
of the market leaving ever less weight to rights and freedoms defined in terms of 
respect for men and women as private subjects and political actors (citizens).19 
In this sense the juridical order of the European Union can with right be called a 
market fundamentalist order. (Paradoxically, a political order in which regulation of 
the conditions for the workings of the market is the core of the juridical system is 
often called liberal or neo-liberal. The term “ordoliberal” might be more appropriate, 
but all these terms carry a heavy and diffuse historical and theoretical burden. 
There will always be much confusion about what the relation is between freedom 
and liberalism on any meaningful and precise sense of the terms as long as the 
dependence of “free” markets on public authority and regulatory capacity is not 
properly acknowledged.) Because of this history market regulation has always 
been at the core of EU-integration and its most richly developed part in terms 
of legal and other instruments for governance, from the 1950s up to the Single 
European Act, signed in 1986, and even, as I would argue, up to the Maastricht 
Treaty (Treaty on European Union), signed in 1992. One of the most obvious 
19 It is controversial whether the charter on fundamental rights that is part of the Lisbon treaty 
means a step backward or forward for the constitutionalisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights in the European Union as compared with the constitutional tradition of the member states. The 
shift I refer to is, however, a separate, more fundamental issue.
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features of the conceptual structure and the policy framework of the EU treaties as 
well as of the political output and the balance of power in the day-to-day running of 
the EU has therefore been that all of these have been cut loose from many of the 
key conceptions and aspirations that have been deeply ingrained in the political 
cultures of the member states in the 20th century. 
The EU-treaties, therefore, for a long time had almost no place for a discourse 
of social fairness based on the acknowledgement of social and economic rights. 
The juridical context has improved to some extent since the 1990s.20 Nevertheless, 
the policies of the European Union are still rather complacent about issues of social 
justice and fairness. One major reason for this state of affairs is the balance of 
competencies. The internal market remains the most richly developed aspect 
of the European Union. It has developed with slight attention to questions of 
redistributive justice for the obvious reason that the EU has had little competence 
in taxation and fiscal policies. Fiscal policy, and with it, most instruments for social 
justice, have explicitly remained a responsibility chiefly for the member states. For 
this reason alone it was always easy to predict that as recent crisis management 
policies coming from the commission, the council, the finance ministers meeting 
to govern the euro-zone, from the ECB and also from the IMF as part of “the 
Troika”,21 increasingly take precedence over national policies, guiding the latter and 
restricting their room for manoeuvre, the waning of social concern should follow 
naturally.
This shift in policy, from national controlled fiscal policy with a relatively high 
social quality, to EU-driven more market-friendly budgets has, together with many 
substantial provisions of the treaties regarding the functioning of the internal 
market, common trade policy and the priority of provisions regulating the market as 
compared with social, labour and environmental provisions produced a historical 
shift in the system of governance. Power has been transferred from the political 
system to the market. Legislation and the way in which administrative power is 
exercised will in the emerging European Union on the whole be relatively more 
influenced by the logic of the market and market actors and less by the political 
sphere than they are in the member states or as compared with the former European 
Community. 
The counterargument to the concern just raised is that even if we accept its 
truth we must acknowledge that globalisation has dwarfed the nation states. 
Even a European Union with a bad balance in the regulative power of state and 
market is, because of its stronger governance capacity, better for social justice and 
democracy, so the counter-argument goes, than nation states with a relatively better 
balance but weaker capacity. This is all I wish to say here about the first element 
20 See Ojanen 2008a and 2008b. 
21 The Troika is common parlance for committees sent from the IMF, the ECB and the European 
Commission to members states to negotiate terms for international bailouts of their national 
economies. 
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of concern in this overview of the democracy deficit in the European edifice before 
ca. 2000. Other elements are less controversial.
+My second concern is that the European Union is not a parliamentary democracy: 
Its parliament is not a real parliament in terms of its legislative powers and it does 
not have a real government in terms of accountable executive power. Instead by 
far the largest part of the right to legislative initiative and a significant proportion 
of the mandate for political initiative is vested with the unelected commission, 
which enjoys a highly indirect mandate and weak democratic accountability. 
This second concern is of course just the most crucial aspect of a more general 
feature of the European Union in that, amazingly, its institutional structure does 
not respect the established doctrine of the separation of the executive, legislative 
and judiciary powers. I shall not discuss the doctrine here. The initiative monopoly 
of the Commission appears to me deeply problematic democratically even if other 
aspects of the doctrine are given up. 
Closely connected to these issues, and the third characteristic of the EU that I 
wish to draw attention to here, is the fact that the court of justice has an unusually 
large political role as compared with the situation in the member states. Politically 
active high courts may be compatible with political democracy if highly developed 
mechanisms for accountability, transparency and legitimacy are in place. This is 
not the case in the European Union. The politically driving role of the court stands in 
stark contrast to the quality of its democratic mandate, which is even more indirect 
and weaker than that of any other major institution of the Union except, possibly, 
the ECB.
Less often observed, but certainly of no lesser importance is our fourth concern: 
The administrative apparatus of the Union, which plays a driving role in relation to 
national and local public administration has only thin channels of communication 
with governments, elected representatives or the public at large. At the same time, 
we know that the administrative staff of the EU is small and heavily reliant on 
services from lobbyists, in particular from corporate lobbyists. The vast influence of 
lobbyists is all the worse because of the secrecy and culture of corruption in which 
it is embedded.22 
Fifth, due to the structural weaknesses of the common public sphere – the many 
languages and the lack of common fora for debate, the diversity of the cultural and 
political traditions, the weakness of pan-European civil society structures – the 
Union cannot effectively draw informal legitimacy and political direction directly from 
a common European polity but remains largely dependent on indirect legitimation 
through the member states. 
Sixth, this indirect legitimation from the national democracies is extremely 
ineffective due to such factors as the weakness of public attention to and debate 
of the agenda and dynamics of Union affairs, the speed and lack of transparency 
22 For in-depth reports and regularly updated information, see  <www.alter-eu.org> and <www.
corporateeurope.org>.
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when Union wide legislation and policy is formed, the weakness of participation in 
elections for the European parliament and the underdevelopment of mechanisms 
for the national parliaments to follow and give informed inputs into Union policies.
The seventh item on our list of complaint is economic democracy. Arguably, 
trade unions have been the single most powerful and fundamental instrument for 
economic democracy in modern European history. The rise of the European Union 
has been a difficult time for them. This is partly due to organisational history and, 
of course, also to the relatively weak positions of trade unions in EU-legislation and 
institutions. But there are other reasons as well. Trade unions have not been able 
so far to muster collective organisational capacity and efficacy at the European 
Union level. We can understand why. It is not easy in the new Europe to achieve 
coordinative and effective cooperation between unions coming from widely 
different political cultures. In countries like France and Portugal mass-mobilisation 
on the streets plays a far bigger role in trade union activity and in the identity 
of the individual members than in some other member states, such as Germany 
or Sweden where negotiations between state, employers associations and trade 
unions have been the most important arena for translating the mass mobilisation 
achieved by trade unions into influence over economic practices and strategies in 
private corporations and socially redistributive policies by the public authorities.
There have been some changes for the better in the position of the labour 
movement in recent years. The Lisbon Treaty recognises fundamental trade union 
rights and in practical politics common trade union action at the pan-European level 
has been an effective force recently in some individual cases, with the struggle 
over the so called Bolkenstein directive on the liberalisation of services as the 
most important individual example. Nevertheless, important political goals of trade 
unions, such as that of adding a social protocol to the Lisbon treaty, remain distant 
dreams. Thus, while the struggle is on, it is clear so far that the contributions of 
trade unions to economic democracy remain smaller in the European Union as 
compared with the situation in most member states. 
Historically, the democracy deficit and its evolution are easily understandable. 
In the 1950s the common European institutions were rather weak and uninfluential 
as compared with the member states. Hence, there was, as we already noted, 
little need to place demands for a democratisation of the European community 
high on the political agenda. But as the balance of power has gradually shifted 
the other way the relative importance of the inherited democracy deficit has grown 
dramatically. 
Against this background it becomes essential to assess to what extent the 
pinnacle of European institutionalisation so far, the Lisbon Treaty that came into 
effect in 2007, brings progress with respect to the legacy of democratic deficits.
On the positive side we may note the following. There are (i) a provision for the 
right to citizen’s initiatives; (ii) some improvements on rules of access to documents; 
(iii) improvements on transparency in the workings of the council of ministers when 
it performs its legislative function; (iv) some strengthening of the indirect chain 
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of legitimacy through the slightly enhanced role of national parliaments in EU-
legislation; (v) an increased clarity in the balance and distribution of power between 
the ministerial council, the commission and the European Parliament that includes 
a strengthening of the role of the elected Parliament, and also, as noted already, 
(vi) improved recognition of social and economic rights.
Less often noted in public debate, but equally clear, is that with the Lisbon 
Treaty the European Union has also taken several important steps backward in 
terms of democracy. I will mention six such regressive steps. I will provide some 
discussion only of the sixth, controversial item on the list.
(i) The Union now has a president and foreign minister with unclear, indirect and 
hence democratically weak mandates. (ii) The Lisbon Treaty, with its many layers 
of cross-references, is by any standards a technically highly complex document. It 
is much less understandable to the public than any national constitution. It is even 
considerably more difficult to master, even for specialists, than the previous treaties, 
adding to the challenge of forming an active and informed citizenship. (iii) There are 
many unclear clauses in individual policy areas, such as social and health services, 
making the workings of the upcoming Union unpredictable and paving the way for 
an even greater political role than before for the democratically problematic court of 
justice. (iv) Extremely problematic for transparency, predictability and democratic 
accountability is the scope the Lisbon provisions on international trade allow for 
influence on national and EU-wide labour, social and health legislation and policy, 
and also, for example, on environment policy, through external trade agreements 
and the dispute settlements mechanisms agreed for them, most notably under 
World Trade Organisation agreements.23 (v) We must also note that the new 
provisions for “fast track” authority for heads of state to revise the Treaty (art. 48) 
open up the prospect of constitutional development with even less transparency, 
public debate and democratic participation than has been the case until now.
(vi) The sine qua non of any democratic constitution is a provision according to 
which the power of the state belongs to the people. There is no such core provision in 
the Lisbon Treaty. This fact is rarely noticed. The technical argument for overlooking 
the lack is that the Lisbon Treaty is not a constitution in the classical sense. The 
argument is, however, today a weak one. As long as the European cooperation 
structures were clearly intergovernmental, any foundational, constitutional provision 
would have been anomalous. In the new treaty some foundational provisions are 
introduced but not, however, the democratic core principle. At the same time it 
is clear that in many respects the Lisbon Treaty is the symbolic and functional 
equivalent of a constitution. Therefore the fact that what I call the democratic core 
principle is not there in the treaty marks the end of a historical era and the beginning 
of a new one. Even some of the most fundamental democratic achievements that 
European citizens have got used to since the British and French revolutions have 
now vanished in thin air. One aspect is this: The Lisbon Treaty defines the rights 
23 For some references, see footnote 52 below.
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and liberties of citizens of the European Union. But these rights and liberties are 
no longer brought by the citizens themselves, as the authors of the Treaty, to 
themselves, as subjects to the law it imposes. The rights now belong to the citizens 
only thanks to the benevolence of the Union. 
One sometimes hears the claim that thanks to the multi-layered structure of 
the EU-law the citizens of the European Union have retained their sovereignty 
nevertheless. The suggestion is that there is no need to makes the uppermost level 
of law, that is, Union law, a direct expression of the will of the people because the 
people are sovereign at the lower level of their separate member states, and the 
upper level, where citizens are not sovereign, only has power over the lower level 
to the extent that the lower level has given explicit agreement to giving it away. This 
is the so called principle of deferral in the European Union that, supposedly, should 
explain why there is no need, or even a reason, to state in the Lisbon Treaty that 
the power of the Union belongs to its peoples. It is, however, a juridical fig leaf only. 
The first problem is with the process whereby power has been deferred. In 
many cases transfer of power from member states to the European Union has 
happened through procedures with weak democratic quality.24 
The second problem is the unidirectionality of the principle. According to art 
3.b. of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union derives whatever powers it has from the 
member states, according to the principle of deferral. But deference is difficult 
to control democratically. There are two issues here. The most blatant issue is 
the difficulty of reversibility. For treaty change unanimity between member states 
is required. This is of course all right as far as expansion of EU-competencies 
is concerned (and as long as the EU maintains its always partly fictional identity 
as an organisation with sovereign member states as its members). But when 
member states democratically seek to retract an earlier transfer of competence the 
unanimity requirement becomes a trap. The sole instrument that the citizens have 
at their disposal in order to maintain their reflexive sovereignty, or their control over 
so-called competence-competence (i.e. their right to withdraw powers that have 
been given away to the Union) is the purely black and white instrument to decide, 
through national procedures, about membership in the Union.25
The third challenge to member states who wish to exercise control over the 
principle of deferral is the reflexive problem of understanding and defining exactly 
the scope and nature of the powers that the member states have deferred to the 
Union according to the Lisbon treaty. This problem finds a technically elegant and 
precise solution in the articles defining the competencies of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, together with the Protocol on the application of the principles 
24 For the Finnish case, I refer to two collective petitions by Finnish intellectuals to Parliament; one 
from the time when Finland decided to join the European Monetary Union in 1997 and the second 
from the time when Finland ratified the TSCG-Treaty in 2012. (The latter letter was delivered to 
Parliament on 11th December 2012.) See also my remarks below on the process in Slovenia, France 
and the Netherlands.
25 Procedures for the cessation of membership have for the first time been included in the treaty of 
the European Union with the Lisbon Treaty.
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of subsidiarity and proportionality, esp. art. 8, to the same treaty: With the exception 
of the common foreign and security policy, the European court has sole jurisdiction 
over the existing division of competencies between member states and the Union. 
In other words, whenever it is not clear what powers members states have deferred 
it is clear that the power to resolve the issue has been deferred to the Union, 
specifically to its court. Moreover, the principle of deferral in the treaty ignores, 
but is not designed so as to actually remedy, the democratic calamity that the 
realm of Union competence has, since the late 1960s, expanded only partly on 
the basis of explicit revisions to the treaty. To a large extent the expansion has 
happened through decisions by the European court and through a post factum 
juridical codification there of processes of coordination and harmonisation that 
were originally conceived only as political measures agreed upon at the summits 
of European heads of state and at other fora as well. A further source of obscurity 
concerning the nature and extension of powers conferred to the Union is due to the 
expansion of Union competence in the realm of external economic cooperation. 
The future impact of this external competence on internal legislation and policy 
formation in the Union and its member states and for the competencies of the Union 
depends on global political and juridical dynamics and cannot easily be foreseen. 
Is the crudeness of the tools available for citizens wishing to exercise their 
reflexive sovereignty a problem for democracy? When seen from the perspective of 
a formal conception of democracy, the problem may seem marginal, perhaps even 
as a routine case of legal layering in a time when international legal instruments 
proliferate. But from the point of view of effective democratic sovereignty there is 
a decisive difference between the implications of EU membership as compared 
with membership in any other international agency to which some authority has 
been deferred. The vital difference is that the EU competencies are large in most 
policy areas. In consequence, the functional costs for any member state of leaving 
the Union are unusually high. They are in fact so high as to be incomparable to 
the costs of leaving any other intergovernmental body. This seems to me to be the 
rational element behind the unpleasant but recurring, often rather inarticulate, idea 
that sometimes surfaces in public debate, that the European Union will eventually 
disintegrate through chaos and violent internal conflicts.
I close my discussion of what I have called the lacuna at the heart of the Lisbon 
Treaty. The main point here was that with the Lisbon Treaty we have entered a 
stage in the evolution of European democracy when it is, at best, unclear, whether 
we can say that the citizens of the European Union are sovereign in the classical 
modern sense that the power exercised by the highest public authorities that they 
are supposed to support, trust and obey is their own power. 
The overall picture we arrive at of the development of democracy in the EU-
area from the 1950s to 2007 is clear. The “European project” that has been since 
its inception criticised for its shortcomings in terms of democratic quality has during 
this time in many respects gone from bad to worse. This has happened through 
steady evolution and has proceeded without much notice of the legitimate demand 
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according to which the increased shift of power from the member states to the 
European Union creates a need for a deepening of democracy at the Union level.26
3.2. Democracy in Europe 2003–2013
From the mid-nineteenth century through much of the twentieth century European 
history was significantly driven by widely shared high hopes that mobilised mass 
movements in the various nations. In recent years utopian yearnings have, for good 
or bad, become marginal in political life. There is a lot of functional pressure: global 
warming, the transnational restructuring of the world economy, the new security 
threats and the increased competition for natural resources and skilled labour are 
often seen as new factors that place strict limits on the choices available in public 
policy, especially at the national level. The shift to what has been called TINA-
politics (There Is No Alternative -politics27) has pushed the utopian aspiration that 
remains to the margins of electoral politics, as is the case with social-liberal and 
social democratic political formations in most countries in Eastern and Central 
Europe, new left autonomous politics in South Europe or green localism in North-
Western Europe and the USA. The political idealism that still exists has during 
the past decades largely been recast in a new mode. It is now often either rather 
defensive and culturally unambitious or ghettoized and decoupled from hope for 
radical betterment for whole nations, regions or globally.
It was in this context of a heightened sense of necessity and weakened utopian 
energy and also in the context of the worry that the growing significance of the 
Union had not been coupled with democratic reform that European integration 
entered into a new phase of development in the early years of the new millennium. 
The new phase has had two distinct stages. The first stage was the “constitutional 
process” that led to the Lisbon Treaty and the second stage is the current crisis 
with its “executive federalism” discussed above.
26 The European Union is often presented as a model of integration for other regions as well, 
especially for Africa, Latin America and South East Asia. (For a critical analysis see e.g. <www.
tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/eula-integration_0.pdf>, accessed 30 July 2013.) For this 
reason the regressive shift in Europe need not be of interest only to Europeans. It may, despite 
Europe’s decline, be of world historical significance. It seems reasonable to look at the period 
from the French Revolution to the fall of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc 
as a period of global progress for liberal, constitutional democracy. But in view of the post-war 
development in Western Europe and also of more recent developments in Russia (during the last ten 
years or so), in China (since May 1989), in India (since the rise of the BJP into significance), in sub-
Saharan Africa (with the great African war and the difficulty of consolidating of democracy in major 
countries, including South Africa and Nigeria) and in the United States of America (since 9/11), the 
overall picture globally now seems bleak. This is true even if there are important positive cases as 
well, thanks to the great effort by the democracy movements in many countries in Latin America in 
the past decades as well as in some other countries including Nepal and, of course, despite all the 
present difficulties, some of the Arab countries. 
27 I first learnt the term TINA-politics from conversations with Tariq Banuri in the late 1980s and 
he may have coined it. It is sometimes attributed to Margaret Thatcher. I have not traced its history. 
In my experience it is an established critical term since many years among activists in international 
non-party movement politics and a term that also finds powerful, repressive use in public debate. 
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In May 2003 Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas published a co-signed 
essay on European integration.28 The essay was published at the time when inter-
governmental negotiations about a Constitutional Treaty for the European Union 
were at a crucial stage.29 The timing of the publication together with the place of 
publication – a leading daily newspaper – made it impossible not to read the essay 
also as an intervention into day-to-day politics. The message in that respect was 
clear: Derrida and Habermas were in favour of the constitution and also, even more 
sharply, in favour of deepening integration in which the core states (“Kerneuropa”) 
take the lead in a process that other member states will need to adjust to. The 
desired result should be a constitution without “separatism.”
As indicated above, I have great sympathy with Habermas and Derrida’s basic 
agreement that the European Union needs a constitution. Nevertheless, one might 
think that it is of some relevance to uphold a clear distinction between a principled 
commitment to an explicit constitutionalisation of the integration process that 
encompasses large parts of Western and Central Europe and the political judgement 
of the day that the constitution that was discussed in 2003 deserves support. It was 
therefore disappointing that there was nothing in Habermas and Derrida’s essay 
that suggests that they had read the draft of the constitution the acceptance of 
which they advocated. The observations we made above about the democratic 
shortcomings of the Lisbon Treaty all apply to the draft constitution that Habermas 
and Derrida raised their voice to support. Nevertheless, Habermas and Derrida 
paid no attention to these matters. In this they were by no means unique. On the 
contrary, the only reason to mention their joint essay here is that it is typical of the 
cosmopolitan moods of those times: Many cosmopolitans wanted the constitution 
long before they had read it and with little regard for its substance and democratic 
quality.30 We may also note that in that essay there is nothing that suggests that the 
authors had, in this particular case, any real concern for the internal connection, so 
powerfully and creatively explicated by Habermas and so incisively questioned by 
Derrida elsewhere, between the democratic, rational quality of the process through 
28 Habermas & Derrida 2003.
29 I continue to refer to the entire process, since the 1950s, of founding and developing the juridical 
framework for the European Economic Community (as it was called up to the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992) and the European Union as a process of constitutionalisation. I will call the document 
proposed by a convention formed by the EU member states that was entitled “Constitutional Treaty 
for Europe” the constitution. The uncertainty concerning the basic political and juridical terminology, 
reflected in the neologism “constitutional treaty” and partly addressed in scholarly debates about the 
so called new constitutionalism, is symptomatic of the opacity of the European integration process. 
(Optimists would perhaps speak of the creativity of the process rather than of its opacity. Such 
optimism invites the question, not pursued here, creativity for what?) 
30 In my country, Finland, it was seen as trivial that the government and parliament committed 
themselves to ratification of the constitution (and later, also of the so called Lisbon Treaty) long 
before it had been subjected to analysis and public debate. In fact, it was seen as normal in most EU-
countries that the political decision to approve the constitution could be taken long before any details 
of the text, or even of many of its fundamental provisions, were known. See for example, the note on 
the political quality of the Slovenian ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by Slavoj Žižek entitled “What 
Does Europe Want”. Žižek 2008: <elpais.com/diario/2008/07/08/opinion/1215468004_850215.
html> (accessed 24.7.2013) 
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which the constitution is drafted and approved and the identity of the emerging 
political entity and the self-understanding of its citizens.31
This, then, is one side of the new Europe that was formed through the 
constitutional process that gave birth to the new European Union of the Lisbon 
Treaty: There is in this Europe a new readiness of intellectuals, elected politicians 
and others to sign up to political changes that everyone agrees are of historical 
significance regardless of content and irrespective of access to information. The 
readiness is all the more surprising as it has arrived in times of peace and hence 
in times with no obvious time pressure. This undoing of informed consent as a 
norm that serves a vital, critical function in democratic proceedings and public 
debate, is, as I wish to suggest, an important novel, regressive feature in European 
democratic history.32
A related feature of European integration, and the second theme that needs to 
be addressed here, became visible in the run up to the French and Dutch referenda 
on the proposed constitution in 2005. When the referenda were announced the 
pro-side had the support of a comfortable majority of the voters, according to polls 
in both countries. When the votes came in the safe yes to the constitution had 
turned into a 54,9 % NON in France and 61,6 % NEE in the Netherlands. What had 
happened?
One thing we know is that a clear majority of people belonging to the political 
and economic elites in both countries were vigorously in favour of the constitution 
throughout. We may also suspect that there was, favourable polls notwithstanding, 
always some lack of clarity about and confidence in the level and quality of mass-
support for the constitution. Nevertheless, even just half a year before the referenda, 
many would have thought that the kind of massive campaign for a yes-vote that 
was seen in both France and the Netherlands – a campaign that enjoyed the 
active support from an overwhelming majority of the leaders of the most significant 
political organisations and large corporations as well as solid backing from the 
31 Habermas 1992; 1999; Derrida 1990. In their joint essay in 2003 Habermas and Derrida point to 
the massive demonstrations against the war on Iraq that took the place all around Europe in the early 
spring of 2003 as a reason for a new mild optimism about the emergence of a common European 
public sphere that would help remedy the democratic deficit of the EU. My empirical reading of 
the demonstrations is that the World Social Forum process played a crucial role in making their 
global coordination and the synchronisation of their political message possible. The call for common 
demonstrations on 15 February 2003 emerged from a meeting of the European Social Forum. The 
demonstrations were thus arguably, at least to some extent, more the regional expression of a 
new global movement (or, as I would rather say, of the World Social Forum as a new vehicle for 
intercontinental dialogue and democratic public space) than a European phenomenon. Probably the 
best book on the world social forum is still Whitaker Ferreira 2006.
32 In defence of the legitimacy and rationality of the current democracies in the European Union 
it may be said that many of the parliamentarians in the member states who cast their vote in favour 
of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty did so on the basis of a concern for the “Big Picture” rather than 
on the basis of detailed knowledge and assessment of the actual text. If we grant this we will still 
need to assess the significance of the gap that exists between the more demanding democratic 
expectations concerning, for example, time, transparency, expert assessment and other reflective 
and deliberative procedures that regulate constitutional change at the national level and the lesser 
demands that have always been in place in the constitutional process for the European Union.
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media – would have made acceptance of the constitution a safe bet. Nevertheless 
on the day of the referendum the constitution was rejected by clear majorities.
The standard explanation of the surprising result has been that the effort of the 
elites backfired. Supposedly, the people in France and the Netherlands voted in 
protest against the politicians, rather than against the EU-constitution as such. The 
point is speculative and not easily proven wrong. Yet it seems to me essentially false 
for three reasons. Firstly, the empirical findings of the exit-poll studies conducted 
by the European commission on the reasons voters gave for their voting behaviour 
do not match this explanation.33 Secondly, the Non/Nee came out after a display 
of phenomenal grass root mobilisation and energy among the population at large. 
This was the case especially in France. In the Netherlands local campaigning and 
public participation in debate was comparatively lower whereas in France books 
on the constitution became best-sellers, hundreds or even thousands of campaign 
groups were organised from below, thousands of debates and rallies took place. It 
is difficult not to conclude that as many people in France, and probably also in the 
Netherlands, learnt more about the constitution they became more, not less, critical 
of it then they had been initially.34 The third problem is that even if we interpret the 
rejection of the constitution in the two referenda primarily as protests against the 
current governments and their policies it is difficult to keep this protest apart from 
the protest against the current mode of European integration. People protested 
against the social and economic consequences of their government’s policies. But 
these policies are intimately connected to the ordoliberalism of the increasingly 
powerful European Union described above. 
Let us note also that only three years after the Non/Nee in the referenda the 
European Union was back on track. The constitution that was rejected in 2005 
was abandoned at first, but only to be replaced soon by the proposal we now 
know under the name of The Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty differs from the 
constitution that was rejected in 2005 in two significant respects. The word 
“constitution” was scrapped in the title of the document as also the paragraphs 
about European symbols; the hymn, the motto, the flag and the nation day. The 
second difference is that the Lisbon Treaty does not have the linear book form of 
the constitution. It rather retreats to the complex mode of presentation of the old 
EU-treaties. In consequence, the treaty preserved almost all the material provisions 
of the constitution that were rejected in the French and Dutch referenda but it did 
so in a way that makes it almost impossible for non-specialists to decipher. The 
difficulty is thorough. It is, to take just an example that adds drama to some of what 
33 See <ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl171_en.pdf and  <ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/
fl172_en.pdf> (accessed on Nov. 11 2008). 
34 Many will remember the dry comment by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former president of France 
and chair of the convention that drafted the EU constitution, when the Non was a fact, that the 
government made a crucial mistake in distributing the proposed constitution to all households in 
France. Giscard d’Estaing would surely have preferred uninformed consent over informed rejection. 
(See the article by Elaine Sciolino, based on an interview with Giscard d’Estaing, in the New York 
Times, June 15, 2005.)
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was discussed above, quite difficult even for specialists to understand the exact 
extent of the powers deferred to the union by the member states. 
As we saw above, the Lisbon Treaty raises intricate issues for the question of 
ownership of general juridical competence, (i.e., competence over competence or 
“reflexive sovereignty”). Here one more problematic observation must be added 
to our earlier discussion. For the idea of a society whose citizens enjoy political 
autonomy as carriers of a democratic constitutional order the lack of perspicuity of 
their highest legislation is a very severe challenge: The reason is that it will be next 
to impossible for the citizens of the European Union to give informed contributions 
to the long-term development of a polity and society whose defining juridical 
documents are in fundamental respects beyond their comprehension.
The Lisbon treaty, which replaced the draft constitution of 2003 that was rejected 
by French and Dutch citizens in 2005, has not been brought to a new referendum in 
these countries. Astonishingly, the explicit argument by political leaders favourable 
to the constitutional project was that referenda would put it at risk.35 The case of 
Ireland is different but not less problematic. In Ireland a referendum was obligatory 
for domestic reasons. When the Irish rejected the Lisbon Treaty on June 12, 2008 
the referendum was repeated a year later. Only then, on 2nd October 2009, was the 
“correct” outcome achieved and the Lisbon Treaty could enter into force soon after, 
on 1st December 2009.
The developments we have just registered reinforce our overall suggestion 
that, despite the growing need for democratisation, the democratic quality of the 
European Union has in recent times in fact gone from bad to worse. From the 
cynical perspective of the disinterested observer we may even take some delight in 
this occasion to test empirically, on a grand scale, who was more in the right, Jürgen 
Habermas or Niklas Luhmann, in their 1970s debate about legitimation in our times: 
Was Habermas right when he claimed that governance in contemporary societies 
remains dependent on democratic legitimation or was Luhmann right with his vision 
of ethically purified systemic integration in which rational and moral legitimacy is 
just one integrative resource among others with no functional privilege?36
35 French president Sarkozy was during his term particularly explicit in arguing publicly against 
referenda on the ground that they might yield the wrong result. For a similar pronouncement by the 
president of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, see Het Financieele Dagblad 6 February 2007.
36 Habermas & Luhmann 1971. The Habermasian framework for conceptualising legitimacy has 
of course met much criticism. At the level of abstraction we engage in here the choice is however 
not so much between different theories of legitimacy but rather between theories in which politics 
remains conceptualised within a framework where the ideas of self-determination and citizenship 
have a moral, critical potential and others in which this is not the case. From our perspective then, 
alternative approaches to the legitimation issue that are critical of the abstractness of Habermas’s 
communicative idealism, of his alleged lack of sensitivity to postmodern, feminist and postcolonial 
problematisations of subjective freedom and human plurality or of his lack of sensitivity to the problem 
of conflict and antagonism in political life, all remain at the Habermasian side of the debate between 
him and Luhmann. Cf. Derrida’s note on the commonalities between him and Habermas in his note 
to the article he and Habermas co-published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 31 May 2003. For 
some reflections on the intellectual history of the debate over whether societal reproduction requires 
widely shared cultural values, see Honneth 2011, 18ff., and references provided there.
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Be that as it may, a fundamental feature of the liberal, republican democratic 
tradition in Europe and North America, which found its first mature theoretical 
expression in Kant’s political philosophy, was the notion that men and women can 
give up their sense of political participation and responsibility, their understanding 
of themselves as citizens, only by giving up a large part of their sense of self-
determination, and, hence, of an essential dimension of their vision of a fulfilling 
life. In this framework, the modern state, when democratic, can provide a basis for 
a politically free life for each person as a citizen. 
The happy unity of individual autonomy and lawful citizenship is, as Kant and 
other thinkers of the Enlightenment envisioned and many have later agreed, made 
possible by the fictive but normatively consequential and politically immensely 
productive idea of a rule of law grounded in constitutions, which are the expression 
of the rationally formed and free will of the citizens.37 Interestingly, in the light of 
the considerations presented above, the quality of the constitutional process of 
the European Union makes it almost impossible to think of the emerging Union as 
a democratic, constitutional entity in the Kantian sense. Not only is the Union not 
getting a constitution that is a genuine and clear expression of the desires of the 
people. This in itself would be no news since an after the fact acceptance has been 
the ground for the legitimacy of European constitutions at the national level. But 
now, with the European Union, we see the emergence of the functional equivalent 
of a constitution of which we have very good, empirically tested reason to believe 
that it is one the majority of the people, at least in some member states, do not 
want. We have reason also to say that this functional equivalent of a constitution is 
one the majority of the population neither knows or understands well.
So far we have in this section gathered two diagnostic observations: one about 
the undoing of informed consent as a normative standard and a second about the 
demise of concern for the Enlightenment ideal that constitutions ought to serve 
as expressions of the aspirations of the citizens and have their approval, at least 
post factum. In order to understand the full significance of the recent dynamics 
in European politics for democracy the rise into ever larger prominence of the 
European Union needs to be seen in the light of these two democratic shortcomings 
of the constitution-building process of the last decade. They must also, thirdly, be 
considered in the light of the actual quality of the rules, norms and processes that 
have governed the ordinary functioning of the common European institutions up to 
now and continue to do so, regardless of the fate of the Lisbon Treaty.
The case in point is fiscal power. According to the main principles governing the 
distribution of competencies between the European Union and its member states 
in the Maastricht Treaty and even in the Lisbon Treaty, the intention has been to 
respect the sovereignty of national governments and parliaments in budget matters. 
Recently, especially in Germany, but also in other countries, there has been much 
debate about the compatibility of the management of the euro-crisis, with respect 
37 Kant 1949.
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for the national fiscal sovereignty. Costly bailouts of banks and loan packages 
to indebted countries, the costs and risks of the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), as well as the new agreements that give both soft 
power (including ex ante evaluation of national budgets) and the right to enforce 
sanctions on in breach of common agreements (most clearly in the case of the 
TSCG, the “Fiscal Compact”) are key ingredients in the debate.38
The debate strikes me as belated: It was always unrealistic to think that we can 
keep fiscal policy strictly national while constructing a common monetary policy 
for the euro-zone.39 But this unrealistic fantasy has remained important throughout 
the European Union, not least as a source of legitimacy for national governments 
claiming in national politics some sovereignty, and fighting national elections on the 
premise that the elections are decisive for access to power over the redistributive 
aims and effects of nationally executed fiscal policies. In 2011-2013 we have seen 
trust in the promise of sovereignty in fiscal policies whither away rapidly, most 
obviously in the countries living under the diktats of the Troika,40 but increasingly 
also in other Eurozone countries. The withering away in the eye of the public of 
national fiscal sovereignty is deeply problematic for the legitimacy of national 
democracies. The consequence for EU-legitimacy is severe. The Union is, as we 
have seen, extremely weak in terms of legitimacy acquired directly from its citizens. 
The less convincingly it can claim indirect legitimacy via the democracy derived 
from the member states, the deeper the crisis of democracy for the Union.
The main response so far, among the citizens, to all the regressive developments 
we have recorded above, has been twofold. We have seen the rise of the populist 
right in electoral politics and also widespread resignation and depoliticisation. 
Cosmopolitan politics is on the decline all through Europe.
The fundamental assumption of this essay is that there will be no shift from the 
current drift in the flow of money from poor to rich and power from the democratic 
38 See, for example, Tuori 2012.
39 It was clear to the people who proposed the euro, that is, the European Monetary Union and its 
position in the EU edifice as whole in the present form, that the separation of monetary and fiscal 
policy is problematic and creates a potential for crisis. Awareness of this fact was widespread and 
visible since the inception of the euro, and it has, as we know, been used to galvanise support for 
the so called Stability and Growth Pact agreed originally at EU summits in 1997 and to legitimise 
the Pact and later rounds of reform of it, in 2005, 2011 and 2013. The occurrence of a crisis like the 
one we see today should, therefore, have come as a surprise only to the rather small community 
of economists and lobbyists who preached, between somewhere in the 1990s and the crash of 
Lehman Brothers, that capitalism has entered a post-crisis era. In public debate and academic 
debate the predictions of a crisis, and the warnings that the structure of the euro is crisis-prone, 
were always a significant topic. See, for example, Roos 2002; and Patomäki 2012.
40 The most notorious cases of extra-constitutional action by EU institutions are the interventions 
by the ECB in the sovereign debt market, but the problems are very many, including, for some years 
already, the obscure role of the EU summits. (See again Tuori 2012. In member states the most 
striking cases of breaches by governments of the rule of law come from the countries put under the 
surveillance of the Troika. See, for example, <blogs.euobserver.com/phillips/2013/01/21/decree-o-
matic-the-peripherys-permanent-state-of-exception>, accessed 31st July 2013). But the problem 
reaches deep into the political systems of other countries as well.
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system to technocrats and corporations unless an improvement of the quality of 
power can be achieved first.
Radical deliberative democracy is, arguably, the most important source of 
rationality, freedom and justice in politics. Hence, if we want to avoid a further 
consolidation of authoritarian, post-democratic capitalism in Europe we need to 
address, honestly and without confusing our legitimate post-national idealism with 
the realities of the present, the question of the quality of power in the European 
Union that we have today, especially the quality of its democracy. That may be clear 
to all cosmopolitans. Nevertheless, there has been a lot of silence where there has 
been a need for debate. I think it is important that we reflect on the sources of this 
silence. In order to do so I suggest we go back to where we started and reflect 
again, from a new angle, on how many good people in “the cosmopolitan family” 
have reacted to the eurocrisis or to what I prefer to call “the crisis of the many and 
the triumph of the few.”
IV. Europe’s existential crisis
The idea that the crisis of the last few years is an “existential crisis” for “Europe” or 
for a “European project” has been popular in debate. Cosmopolitans like to use this 
phrase. I suggest that this reaction should make us pause. Why is that we find it 
apt to say of the crisis of the many and the triumph of the few that it is an existential 
crisis? 
Let us ask first what “Europe” stands for? What idea of Europe must we already 
have accepted before we can think that it, “Europe”, is in crisis now? Apparently, 
“Europe” is here equated with the European Union. When people say that Europe, 
or the European project, is in an existential crisis what they mean is not that some or 
any European project is in a crisis. They mean that because of things that happen 
today it is possible that the European Union will fall apart and cease to exist and 
they suggest that if this happens it bears a much larger significance than the falling 
apart of any ordinary institution. 
The suspicion is that people think that there is an internal relation between the 
European Union and some idea of Europe or some European civilisational ideals 
such that the collapse of the European Union will be harmful for the idea or the 
realisation of some valuable ideals. I have my qualms about the usefulness of the 
notion that there is such a thing as an idea of Europe and about the usefulness 
of the notion that there are “European ideals.”41 But, even if we accept without 
41 Even the fine recent study of the idea of (esp. in Husserl’s work) by Miettinen (2013) stops 
short of critical reflection on the discursive regime that controls the potential of discourse about 
Europe today. I have argued elsewhere that cosmopolitans would be well advised to avoid the word 
Europe (and associated words) when they explain their moral aims and political strategies. When a 
universalist semantic framework is in place it is, of course, alright to turn to the issue of how politics 
and the institutional design of Europe can best serve overall cosmopolitan global projects. (Cf. 
Wallgren 1998).
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argument, that some legitimate use of those concepts is possible, the ease with 
which the European Union is equated with some ideal Europe is strange. In view 
of the regressive shift in democracy that we have reported on above, should we 
not have expected that cosmopolitans would have welcomed the possibility of the 
collapse of the present “European project”?
The idea that the crisis of Europe has the character of an existential crisis 
provides the clue to understanding the phenomenon I suggest we first regard as 
strange. Let us take a step back. 
The crisis in Europe we talk so much about today is primarily a functional crisis 
of the euro. Secondarily, the sense of crisis is due to the fact that crisis management 
has served the interests of the few at the expense of the many. Thirdly, there is 
unison agreement that democracy has been jeopardised in managing the euro 
crisis. Governments in all countries, but in particular in the worst hit countries, have 
been pressed to accept and enforce severe austerity policies rapidly, with minimal 
time for public debate and parliamentary participation. The same is true of structural 
changes: the European semester, the six-pack, the two-pack, the austerity treaty 
have all been pushed through with little time for democratic scrutiny and discussion 
of alternatives.
If I am right, it is when people claim surprise at the three factors I have just 
mentioned that they raise the alarm call that we are on the brink of an “existential 
crisis” for “Europe.” Nevertheless, in view of our earlier discussion it seems almost 
impossible that any cosmopolitan should have been the least surprised at any of 
the three facts of the crisis: the functional, the social or the democratic. 
The real surprise is, then, that people have been surprised. If we should have 
been alarmed way back about what happens to democracy in Europe, why do 
people ring the alarm bells now, and why did the bells not ring before? 
Something has gone wrong in the self-understanding of those who speak of 
Europe’s existential crisis. Their concerns are genuine and well grounded. But they 
come late and, as we see in the popularity of the notion that the crisis is “existential”, 
they come with an intensity of self-identification with “Europe”, and hence, with an 
intensity of emotion, that calls for some explanation.
Here is the explanation I wish to propose: We, many good cosmopolitans, who 
are now shocked and angry, have a sense that when things go wrong in the EU we 
ourselves are to blame. This is our Union after all. We have invested our political 
capital, our dreams, our support, our strength in this union. Without our loyalty to 
this union its legitimacy, even the shaky one it enjoys today, could not have been 
achieved. We threw ourselves into this particular stream of history, always in the 
hope that we will get our act together later. But now, when things turn out bad, we 
are shattered to learn that we have not lived up to our promise to ourselves. The 
failure we see is our failure. We have not acted – we have lived a life sustained by 
false optimism – and now this has happened to us. 
Not only is our reality becoming miserable, worse still, our dreams are becoming 
miserable, they are being turned against ourselves. And the real problem is deep. 
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We never had the right to have this dream. It was always built on sand and we knew 
it: We know that we should have known all along. So, our European project was 
never even a dream. It was always a delusion. Hence, when we lose confidence 
in the European project we lose something we never rightfully owned. The loss, 
therefore, is one we cannot afford without losing face in front of ourselves. For 
this reason repression, denial, nostalgia, shame and the cynicism that all these 
sentiments tend to breed are all likely to play a huge role in the moral and political 
economy of cosmopolitan responses to the crisis. 
There is a sinister relation between the false optimism and delusions diagnosed 
in this section and the silences and bad judgement I have described earlier. The 
silences are not due, as they may be in other cases, to ignorance, that is, to a 
morally innocent intellectual mistake. They are due to our delusions. And the 
delusions and silences together are the conditions for the possibility of the success 
of the narrative, “the standard view”, presented in section 2 above – that is, for the 
widespread belief in the notion that this narrative will be useful for our cosmopolitan 
political aspiration. 
There is, as I will go on to suggest, a way out of the suicidal moral and political 
semantic regime defined by the standard view, and a way forward to more open 
and promising landscapes. But only if we are Lutheran enough to repent. It will not 
be enough for us to give up our false optimism. We must acknowledge its falsity 
and our part in producing and sustaining the falsity. Only then can we engage with 
brutal realism with the issues we have brushed aside and which we now need to 
address.
It may be disturbing to some, but perhaps instructive nevertheless, to compare 
the commitment of many good social-liberal, green and leftist supporters of the 
“European project” of the 2000s with the commitment of many a good communist 
to the Soviet-Union and other “really existing” socialist projects of the 1900s. I think 
it was Habermas (again) who asked, a few years before the wall came down, how 
long communists loyal to the DDR and the Soviet-Union would be willing to sustain 
the tension between their dream and the reality created in its name. Habermas’s 
question is good because it admits of no armchair answer or high moralism. We 
all know fine people who remain committed communists in Europe today. Their 
communism is yet to come. The question Habermas put to idealist communists 
Dictatorship of Failure
270
in the 1980s can, as I believe, with growing right be put to those who continue to 
support the European Union today.42
V. Sources of the standard view and their problems
5.1. Review and preview
Let me sum up the discussion so far. In section 1, I proposed that there is what 
I have called a standard view – that is, a basic political perspective that is widely 
shared by cosmopolitans today – about how to understand the global political needs 
of our times and the mission of the European Union with respect to these needs. I 
also announced that a key purpose of this essay is to suggest that what I call the 
standard view, for all its merits, is problematic and that it has made it difficult for 
cosmopolitans to understand the euro-crisis well and to respond adequately to it.
In section 2, I began to explain my main thesis. There I described how people 
who subscribe to the standard view defined in the first section have typically 
understood the euro-crisis and responded to it. I presented some sceptical remarks 
on this understanding and response. One suggestion was that there has been a 
surprising neglect of the fact that what we often call the euro-crisis has actually 
been a time of spectacular success if we judge events from the point of view of 
how they have served the interests of the elites. Another suggestion was that in the 
discussion based on the standard view there has been an even more surprising 
neglect of democracy issues. 
In section 3, I turned to the question of democracy in the European Union. I 
argued there that the integration process through which the European Union has 
evolved has been marked by a democracy deficit since its inception. I also argued 
there that the efforts, in the first decade of this century, to constitutionalise the 
European Union have not ameliorated its democracy deficit and that the lack of 
democracy has been exacerbated during the last few years of the “crisis of the 
many and triumph of the few.”
In section 4, I reflected on the lessons of the previous sections. I suggested 
the following: The standard view has prejudiced cosmopolitans to take a positive 
42 In the run up to the Finnish referendum on EU membership in 1994, cosmopolitans here 
sometimes discussed the relation between being true to one’s ideals and honest about how 
one’s ideals meet their reality-test. I remember particularly well discussions with a friend from the 
“alternative movement”, as we used to call it before the green parties were formed, who was then an 
adamant supporter of “the European project” and who later served some terms as a member of the 
European Parliament. On the day after the Finnish referendum on EU membership, on 25th October 
1994, we met. She knew that I was disappointed about the result and found her partly responsible 
because of her active support for membership. On that day my friend told me to call her back “if the 
day comes when the EU tanks roll into our Prague”. When I see anti-austerity riots now, in Portugal, 
Greece and other countries, and I see the tear-gas and the tanks, I wonder whether this is the day to 
pick up the phone and call my friend. Or is it tomorrow? How long is it right for an idealist communist 
or for a true believer in the European project to wait for the tomorrow of good communism or the 
good EU to arrive?
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view of the European Union. Because of this prejudice they have neglected the 
democracy issue. Because of this neglect they have had false hopes about the 
European Union. Because of these false hopes they are now shocked by what is 
happening in Europe, they feel ashamed about their naivety and have a sense of 
guilt. To back my claims I suggested that we pause to reflect on the curious fact 
that the notion that the euro-crisis is an existential crisis has found wide resonance. 
I claimed that many cosmopolitans have been satisfied to speak of the euro-crisis 
as an existential crisis. I suggested that this existential and moral response serves 
as evidence for the diagnosis that it is one of the consequences of the euro-crisis 
that cosmopolitans who subscribe to the standard view are becoming sensitive to 
and alarmed by their complicity in the creation of a “European” project that is now 
in crisis and that is not, and never was, worthy of their support. 
In this section it is my aim to show how cosmopolitans who can identify with 
the analysis so far may move from criticism and self-blame to a restructuring of our 
vision of how to realise cosmopolitan ideals in Europe today. I will do so by looking 
at two themes. One is the idea that the European Union is a peace project, the 
other is the idea that the only way to be realistic and responsible cosmopolitans 
today is through fidelity to the project of enhancing our transnational, democratic 
governance capacity. The two topics have between them a rather different 
significance in the construction of the standard view. The former topic needs to 
be discussed above all in order to remove the emotional and moral obstacles that 
stand in the way of an unprejudiced analysis of the European Union and its crisis. 
The moral urgency with which people often hold on to the standard view and its 
tilted perspective on the European Union can only be properly understood and 
successfully deconstructed if the peace issue is addressed. The latter topic allows 
us to move pretty directly from straightforward analytical criticism to a discussion 
of how we can begin to re-imagine and reconstruct cosmopolitan political idealism 
in ways fitting for the contingent factual conditions of our times.
5.2. Is the European Union a peace project?
The positive idea of the European Union that is part of the standard view described 
in section one is not only nurtured from the source I described there: that is, from 
the ambition to respond to the “globalisation of the market” with a “globalisation 
of (democratic) politics.” Its second source is the idea that the European Union 
promotes peace. This is a powerful idea. It has been used to delegitimise all criticism 
and its widespread support has made it difficult to create a space where a down-
to-earth, critical analysis of the European Union could make itself heard. Hence, as 
long as we fail to do justice to this part of EU-idealism we will also fail to do justice 
to the depth of its roots and the breadth and complexity of its consequences. Only 
if we can uproot the irrational parts of the idealistic attachment to the European 
Union fully can we truly hope to convince members of the cosmopolitan family of 
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the grim reality that the European Union that they have invested their hope in and 
whose growth they have made possible is not worth their allegiance.43 
The basic story we have of the European Union as a peace project is the following: 
when the founding fathers of the post-war project for European integration, with 
Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann as the most visible figures, came out from 
the shadows of the second world war they were convinced, through shattering 
experience, that the citizens of modern European nation states are not to be trusted 
in matters or war and peace. Their desire was peace and they had a vision of 
achieving it through a gradual process of deepening economic cooperation between 
the core countries of Western continental Europe. The rational core of their vision 
was the argument from modern political philosophy that functional integration, 
and more specifically economic exchange that leads to interdependence in the 
satisfaction of needs and pursuit of interests, fosters peace between nations by 
making the costs of going to war very high. Once functional inter-dependence has 
been created through economic cooperation, political integration that fosters post-
national sentiments and a culture of peace will also become possible. This, we 
have been told, was the vision of the founding fathers.
It is very difficult to assess the validity of this story.44 For present purposes no 
assessment is, however, required. The debate can proceed effectively if we grant 
the EU everything as far as the relations between the countries that matter most 
– France and Germany, in particular – in the story go. Let us therefore generously 
assume that the European integration that we have seen has given us 60 years of 
43 For people who are old enough to have experienced the second world war the idea that “more 
Europe” is good for peace has probably been the primary motivational source for their “European 
idealism.” It seems to me, that younger cosmopolitans are often less deeply moved by the idea that 
European integration brings peace. It even often seems to me that what is for the generation of 
Habermas and Derrida a deeply genuine need is for many younger intellectuals and activists shallow 
and corrupt identity politics (shallow, because not founded in formative experience and a serious 
intellectual effort. Corrupt, because nourished more by opportunistic ambition, lazy compliance with 
group pressure and a desire to belong to a fictitious avant-garde than by independent study and self-
searching). I recognise the corruption more from my own activist life than from anything I have read. 
Already for me, but even more so, it seems to me, for people ten or more years younger than me, 
it has been a source of self-esteem that we have portrayed ourselves (to ourselves and to others) 
as people who have grown beyond patriotism and nationalism and who are therefore better people 
than the nationalists of old and present times. The older generations look upon us with sympathy: 
they see in us people who live their dream of post-national political identities, and who will not lend 
themselves to the belligerent politics of national self-interest. I sometimes think that we do not 
deserve the sympathy of the older generation: I wonder whether the will to peace really goes deep 
in us? And I look with suspicion upon the revival of interest among many good “post-national” leftists 
in notions of politics in which antagonism and conflict are judged to be integral to what politics in 
essence is and in which non-violence is frowned at as a romantic, unpractical and dispensable ideal. 
(There is sometimes a strange air of light-heartedness in how even card-carrying anti-essentialists 
today rely on the essentialist metaphysics of Heidegger and Carl Schmitt as resources in their 
intellectual and political work. I do not want to suggest that we should not touch upon Heidegger 
or Schmitt. But we should handle them with care, as if ideas, including theirs, were, still, explosive. 
To avoid misunderstanding of this point, let me also stress that I think the liberal and Kantian and 
Gandhian and eco-philosophical heritages that I tend to rely on in my thinking about politics, must 
also be handled with care. Ideas are dangerous, like life itself.)
44 I bracket here the question to what extent it is idealistic to accept the idea that European 
integration has been at its core a project for peace and not also driven by other, less admirable 
motives. On this, see, for instance, Durán 2007.
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peace in the heart of Europe. The question we are then free to ask is what can we 
say about the EU as a project for peace now?
We must note first that in political philosophy there are two great visions, not only 
one vision, for the construction of peace in modern times. Besides the functional 
argument that lies at the core of the original plan for European integration we 
have the argument from democracy. This second argument proposes that if the 
same people who carry the burden of war have the power to decide about war the 
likelihood of war will decrease. For this reason war between democracies should, 
as Kant thought we could reasonably hope, be unlikely.45 
If we consider both ideas of how to build peace in modern times, the “functional 
idea“ and the “democracy idea“, the idea of the European Union as a peace project 
becomes quite ambivalent.
It is a conspicuous feature of the history of the European Union, that the founding 
fathers who conceived of it as a functionalist peace project were suspicious of its 
citizens. To them, who had just come out of the war, their project for peace was 
coloured through-and-through by anthropological pessimism. It was clear, they 
thought, that in order to achieve lasting conditions of interconnection, cooperation 
and unity, European integration would have to proceed behind the backs of the 
citizens. That is why they envisioned what has often been called the “salami” 
strategy of integration pursued in the development of the European Union: knowing 
that the deep integration that the founding fathers wanted would be rejected by the 
citizens if it was presented to them as one huge package, they decided to sell the 
package to them little by little. This strategy has been skilfully pursued over many 
years and the result, so far, is the European Union of today. 
It is clear, then, that when the EU today suffers from a “democracy deficit” this is 
no coincidental feature. Since the inception of post-war integration the democracy 
deficit has been purposefully and carefully created and protected in order to achieve 
the higher goals of an ordoliberal or market fundamentalist regime (as discussed 
above) and of peace (as discussed here). When we see this clearly we can also 
see, better than before, why cosmopolitans who subscribe to the standard view 
(as defined in section 1) above have tended to neglect an analysis of the state 
of democracy in the European Union. The topic has not only been overlooked 
because of some vision of a future good that we want and will take care of later (i.e. 
the good of transnational political governance), but also because of the notion that 
democracy itself is a problem, perhaps even a threat, to another good that we want 
and need to care for now, that is, the overriding good of peace.
When we put matters this way the following becomes evident: The idea that we 
can use the salami strategy of integration for constructing peace is well-founded 
only as long as we assume that the connection between democracy and peace 
is not vital. This assumption is problematic. In Kant’s analysis, the democratic 
and functional arguments are interdependent: Kant claimed that republicanism 
45 Kant 1977 and 1996.
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is a prerequisite for economic success. As Kant also thought that economic 
success is the most important condition for military might his vision was one in 
which democracies would not only achieve peace between themselves but they 
would also win wars against states that are not democracies.46 From this same 
perspective one can argue that a project that promotes economic interdependence 
but does not also promote democracy is self-defeating both as a project for welfare 
and as a project for peace.
We learn from these considerations the following: The idea, that the vision for 
the European Union from the 1950s and the current reality that this vision has 
inspired can bring peace, can be maintained only on the double condition that 
we give up the idea that democracy is not needed for peace and we accept the 
idea that functionally integrated societies can remain economically successful and 
harmonious internally and will not be belligerent externally. Both conditions seem to 
me highly unlikely in principle and especially so if we consider the political realities 
of our times. I will explain only my reasons for scepticism about the second part of 
the second condition, that is, the idea that a functionally integrated European Union 
will be peaceful in its external relations.
If we ask what the greatest threats to peace are in our times the shortage of 
economically crucial raw materials and natural resources, especially metals, energy, 
fertile land and water, is a major candidate. There is a tension today between two 
different kinds of interests that the large political powers of the world attend to. They 
share an interest in maintaining peace between them in order to safeguard current 
trade and capital flows on which all are dependent for their economic stability and 
prosperity. But they may also have an interest in going to war in order to secure 
their access to scarce resources. The less the current international economic 
regime delivers growth the more the balance between these diverging logics may 
tip in favour of the latter.
The dynamics of the balance between the pros and cons of the present 
“functional world peace” will be different for different actors depending on their 
relative strengths and weaknesses. The European Union is relatively well-placed 
with respect to land and water, but it is relatively short of energy and many metals. 
Hence, whether or not the recent wars in the Middle East and Africa (the wars 
in Iraq and Libya especially) have been ”oil wars”, it is clear that access to raw 
materials and energy poses a real challenge to the long-term economic interests 
of the European Union. 
In this context the obligation (anomalous for any constitution) given by the Lisbon 
Treaty to the member states of the European Union to ”progressively improve their 
military capabilities” and the fact that the same treaty gives the EU-countries a 
mandate to decide go to war (to enact ”peace-keeping, conflict prevention and 
46 Kant 1977. I allow myself the conflation of Kant’s notion of republicanism with my broad 
conception of democracy.
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strengthening international security”) anywhere on the planet without a UN mandate 
(“in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”) seem ominous.47
We should also notice the relevance of the more fundamental questions of 
political philosophy for any comprehensive assessment of the notion that the EU 
is a project for peace. Kant’s belief in progress relies on a very specific theory 
of the internal cohesion between providence, hope and reason in history. Kant 
argued that through the force of a law that is backed by complex institutions and 
the division of labour, reason can exert a civilising influence on politics. But, if 
we are less convinced than Kant was about the compatibility of large institutions 
with real democracy, the Kantian idea that cosmopolitan law and institutions can 
secure peace will seem like a gamble. The great danger with the Kantian paradigm 
from this perspective is that it gives us no space for debate about a possible need 
to limit societal complexity or the potential for mass destruction. The idea that 
cosmopolitans should not only focus on the building of eternal peace but would 
also do wisely to put limits on the means at our disposal if and when peace cannot 
be sustained is, it seems to me, of obvious importance in the light of developments 
in science and technology since Kant. In the Kantian paradigm, it is difficult to 
assign such concern a proper place but it does not follow that the concern can 
easily be dismissed (I will come back to this topic).
When we wish to assess whether a functionally integrated European Union is 
likely to be a force for peace in its external relations we also need to look critically 
at, at least, one further aspect. We need to ask how authentically it is a post-
national project in the sense assumed here, namely, as a project that establishes 
a polity that, because of its new quality of social integration, carries the promise of 
overcoming nationalism of the kind that in the Westphalian era was often mobilised 
for war.
In this context we must turn again to the constitutional process of the European 
Union in the first decade of the new century. Interestingly, the various drafts of the 
Preamble to the proposed constitution of 2003 were wrapped in a high rhetoric 
of praise for the fine values and unique achievements of “Europe”. As already 
mentioned, the drafts also gave a prominent role to the constitutional introduction 
of common, Union-wide symbols and even a Europe day. Later the rhetorical 
elements were deleted. But whether they were deleted on paper only, or will be 
scrapped in practice too, remains to be seen. So far the record is not promising. 
The EU flag flies high, school curricula across the Union have been reformed to 
accord with a new pan-European historical narrative, EU-day is celebrated across 
the subcontinent and, in recent years, we have even seen that willing young men 
and women have been recruited to military campaigns under EU-command. In 
short, it seems that in the European Union we see efforts to construct a new post-
national “imagined community” (Anderson) that is in form, style, emotional effect 
47 Treaty on the European Union, section 2, article 42.1. and 42.3. 
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and political practice modelled on the old imagined communities of the European 
nations. 
Moreover, not only the symbolic practices, but also the substantial provisions 
of the failed constitutional treaty, that fit a new post-national, but still belligerent, 
collective aspiration are also still in place in the Lisbon Treaty. There is the 
reference to “European interests” in article 2. There is a military solidarity clause, 
a clause on close cooperation with NATO and, as we saw already, an ambiguous 
formulation regarding respect for the UN charter combined with a preservation 
of the right to engage in peace-keeping with military means even without a UN 
mandate. In sum, what we see does not look much like a peace project. It looks 
more like a preparation for new imperial wars. The Lisbon Treaty clears the way for 
the Union to develop into a new military alliance formed by the old colonial masters 
on the premise that their combined military might should, at the end of the day, be 
unfettered by the limits set by the current international legal order.
Now, it may be contended that one consequence of the euro-crisis is that 
the construction of the European Union as an imagined community capable of 
collective patriotism on the lines of the nation-states of old, is failing. But for those 
who have invested hope in the European Union as a project for peace the kind 
of erosion of a common European patriotism that we witness today is hardly a 
promising development: What we see is not, I believe, unfortunately, the rise of 
a new European identity that goes beyond the “euro-nationalism” of the failed 
constitution of 2003, to a more universal sense of collective responsibility. What 
we see today, bears more, it seems to me, the semblance of a return to regressive, 
nationalist pasts.48 
For all the reasons given here, it appears to me that it probably was never right 
to think of the European Union as a promising project for peace. It is even more 
clear that even if we grant the European integration project a role as a promoter 
of peace and stability in Western Europe from the 1950s up to the late 1980s 
there is little reason to say that the deepening of European integration of the past 
twenty years has contributed to peace. All in all, I suggest that it is high time for 
cosmopolitans to give up seductive idea that if we want to stand for peace we ought 
to be loyal to this European Union. 
5.3. Transnational governance and the European Union
The fundamental element of the standard view described in section one is the 
conviction that nation states as we knew them in the 20th century are not up to the 
task of putting the checks and limits that we need on the globalised market forces 
48 Worrying evidence does not come solely from the growing support for the fascist party in Greece, 
The Golden Dawn, or from the totalitarian policies of the ruling parties in Hungary, or, even, from the 
rise of parties from the populist right in other countries. Worrying is also the lack of readiness in the 
less afflicted countries of the north of Europe to stand in solidarity with the peoples of the southern 
EU countries, who are suffering the most from the current crisis.
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of our times. Even if the argument about peace is given up, this conviction remains 
in force. Must we not now, finally, consider its truth? Is it not true, whether we like 
or not, that further economic integration is unstoppable, that political integration 
must (therefore) try to keep pace and that (therefore), even after all our criticism, 
we still need this European Union!? Is the EU not, despite all its weaknesses, our 
only hope, or at least our best hope, unless we want to succumb completely to the 
wild forces of the markets?
I want to repeat, first, that I share the dream that a democratised European 
Union could be brought to serve cosmopolitan ambitions. But I am critical of the 
idea that this dream is the only relevant alternative for cosmopolitans. There are 
three reasons for this. One is realism. For reasons already given that I will not 
expand upon, the idea of a democratic Europe that works as a counterforce to 
global market forces is becoming an ever more distant dream. The second reason 
is closely connected to the first and draws a lesson for political strategy from it: only 
if cosmopolitans get together and make their allegiance to the present European 
Union conditional on democratic and social reform with tight timelines will real, 
necessary change become possible. Thirdly, and more fundamentally, if we wish 
to retain a fair degree of freedom in our political theory and practice I think it is 
essential that we address critically the assumptions that have made the standard 
view so attractive to us in the first place. Below I will discuss only the third of these 
reasons. 
To explain myself I will take the following steps. First I will say a few words about 
the idea that this European Union is our best hope. I will move from this practical 
question of rather short-term tactics to the more fundamental question of whether 
the European Union or its functional equivalents is our only alternative. We will 
quickly see that this is not the case, but also that the “decoupling“ or “localisation” 
alternative that I think we must consider is quite problematic too. The fundamental 
idea here is that we do not seek control over (market) forces, which are now 
beyond our reach. Instead we seek to make eliminate the power of these forces 
by overcoming our dependence on them. Serious discussion of what localisation 
politics at best should involve, and how it could be advanced responsibly and 
realistically, is not possible within the limits of this essay. Instead, I turn to another, 
more manageable and more pressing issue: We all know that there is truth in the 
routine criticism that localisation, as a political strategy, can easily be utopian in 
an irresponsible way. But supporters of the standard view all too often neglect the 
fact that the “only” alternative to the standard view is also utopian, and possibly 
even more thoughtlessly and irresponsibly so than the localisation strategy. In the 
following discussion I will identify topics and main lines of this argument. The aim is 
to show that they are worth of serious consideration, at least in view of the gloomy 
perspectives that we otherwise need to face.
Dictatorship of Failure
278
(i) The European Union: Our best hope?
People might say, “All right then: This European Union is far from ideal. But in 
a global perspective what do we have on offer? There is the United States of 
America. There are the BRICS with China and India as potential world powers. 
In this comparison, surely the European Union is by far the best hope, if we want 
to curb the power of finance capital and TNCs.”49 This stance is unrealistic in two 
ways.
First, we do not have good reasons to expect the European Union to be a more 
benign force in world politics in the long run than the alternatives. There are three 
issues we need to consider to make this clear. One is military power. The United 
States of America is presently the only military super-power and, of course, the 
European Union does not share its bellicose track record. But in recent global 
history the role of the European Union has, I would maintain, been more to provide 
political and economic support to military campaigns led by the USA than to work 
for a different and more peaceful international order.50 We must also recall that the 
European Union does not entertain a vision of itself as challenging the hegemony 
of the USA by constructing a new benign post-military source of global power. 
On the contrary, we have seen that in this respect the future vision of Europe that 
we find in the Lisbon Treaty is quite traditional. The second dimension of analysis 
of the quality of power exercised by the European Union in world politics is “soft 
power”, that is, policies, goals and track record with respect to multilateralism and 
the rule of law, human rights, climate, trade, etc. In this dimension there is, despite 
the highly questionable role of the European Union in world trade politics and my 
serious misgivings over the question of trade, some real evidence of the merits of 
49 Immanuel Wallerstein is one among many who has expressed this view. My impression from 
personal conversations and from the reading of various contributions over the years by Wallerstein 
and other proponents of this “realistic” argument, is that it is to some extent rooted in a preoccupation 
with the incurable vileness of Washington. For many political theorists in North America this 
experience dominates the motivational horizon in a way that I think can be compared with the 
tendency of many German political theorists to let their political analysis be guided by the felt need 
to overcome the catastrophic legacy of German nationalism. In both cases, I find the motives most 
appropriate. But they may also sometimes be a cause of imbalance in our judgements. 
50 I recognise the scope for debate of this point e.g. in view of the differences in the positions taken 
recently by the European Union and Washington over Israeli occupation of Palestine territory. See, 
for example,  <www.eccpalestine.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/COM-Notice-guidelines-on-IL-
and-EU-funding-instruments-compact.pdf> (accessed 31st July 2013).
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the European Union as compared with other powerful countries and blocs.51 The 
third issue is future prospects. If we assume that there is a positive relationship 
between democracy and cosmopolitan ambitions, this is where there is seriously 
bad news. We have seen that the European Union has developed more and more 
in the direction of post-democratic governance. Its democratic structure (and, 
arguably, also its practices) already compare unfavourably with those of the USA 
and many other large countries. There is no evidence that speak in favour of an 
upcoming turn to the better. I suggest that the time is now ripe for us to give up the 
idea that, because of earlier democratic achievements in Europe, we have the right 
to invest hope in the European Union today, no matter what the quality of its current 
institutions is and whether we even have bothered to analyse it.52
The second problem area for the idea that the current European Union is our 
best hope for cosmopolitan politics comes into view if we look critically at some 
presuppositions that often inform diagnosis of current challenges to politics with 
cosmopolitan aims. Fundamental here is the notion that the need to respond 
to the growth of transnational markets and corporate power is the issue that a 
cosmopolitan world political strategy needs most urgently to address. 
This focus is inadequate to the current situation in various respects. It invites 
us to ignore several deep changes that take place before our eyes in the relations 
between market-forces, corporations, citizens and political institutions, and also the 
qualitative changes in political power that these changes bring with them. Some 
aspects of the emerging constellation of postdemocratic, authoritarian capitalism 
that will not come into view as long as the centre of our attention is the idea that 
we need “politics” to domesticate the markets and corporations are the following: 
51 A substantial assessment would require consideration of a whole body of technical detail. It 
is not possible to go into any of this here. My general sense of where we stand is the following: 
In climate politics the European Union favours multilateral agreements more than other powerful 
entities. However, as long as the policies that the EU promotes remain market-driven in the way 
that presently dominates its agenda the advantage of this for ecological stability and justice seems 
to me to be small. (For critical analysis of the approach that still dominates the toolbox that the EU 
brings to the climate negotiations, see the pioneering study by Larry Lohmann (2006). In trade 
politics the European Union has stood for many years as an aggressive champion of selfish interest 
with human rights commitments in a hypocritical role. But in this field, too, there are some good 
things to be said about the record of the EU as compared with that of the US, for example, in the 
fields of consumer safety, checks on market-driven development of GMOs and commercialisation 
of culture. (For some critical analysis see the resources provided during many years by the Third 
World Network, www.twnside.org.sg, and the South Centre, www.southcentre.org) But it is in its 
commitment to multilateralism as the backbone of the global governance regime that the EU stands 
out most in comparison with the US. See, however, the discussion that follows.
52 Richard Rorty once wrote that the European Union “just as it stands, even prior to the adoption 
of a constitution –is already the realization of what the Realpolitiker thought was an idle fantasy”. 
(Rorty 2005, 38). Habermas later praised the contribution by Rorty to the Süddeutsche Zeitung as 
the “politically and intellectually sharpest” of the contributions to the debate to which he had invited 
intellectual colleagues on 31st May 2003. (Habermas 2004, 89.) In a similar vein, Habermas once 
argued that even though a UN mandate was blocked in the Security Council, the bombing of Serbia 
in 1999 earned some legitimacy from the alleged fact that the 19 countries that supported the 
miltary campaign are “without doubt democratic”. (Habermas 1999, my translation). Of course the 
European Union is not one of the countries Habermas refers to here. I quote his statement because 
I see the use of the words “without doubt” (the original German word is “zweifellos”) as symptomatic 
of a tendency Rorty and Habermas share with many others, to speak sometimes of the leading 
Western political entities, and especially of the European Union, from a perspective of hope that is 
not always anchored in reality.
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First, the changing nature of socialisation and conditions for citizenship in times of 
(a) mass-migration between continents of the poor and inter-continental mobility 
of the elites; (b) globalised consumer culture and (c) the rise to prominence of 
mass-communication over the web. On the last of these points we have seen 
some growth in public attention to the seamless cooperation between the Big Four 
global corporations (Microsoft, Google, Apple and Facebook) and the “Big Brother” 
of state surveillance.53 But the issues involved are many and complex, and real 
developments are running far ahead of any critical assessment of their effects. 
We simply know very little about important matters, such as the extent and effects 
(e.g. on social identity formation and solidarities) of the globally individualised 
marketing made possible by the accumulation of gigantic amounts of data by 
private companies. Second, the enormous growth of juridical and technical detail 
and institutional complexity in market regulation at the post-national level: a change 
that has made the notion of free markets an oxymoron and that has, it seems 
to me, created a new level of dependence for corporations, political institutions 
as well as citizens on the services of administrative and juridical experts moving 
swiftly back and forth between public and private service.54 Third, (possibly as a 
consequence of the first and second item on the list, or possibly, as a cause of 
them?) “depoliticisation” in Europe, that is, the shrinking voluntary, non-careerist 
participation of citizens in social movements, trade unions and parties, and the 
consequent changes in structures of democratic accountability.
The three items are by no means intended as an exhaustive list of the new 
challenges facing cosmopolitan politics. They are put forward as examples of 
issues cosmopolitans need to deal with, if we wish to have success in the more 
visible task of domesticating transnational capital. Depoliticisation is perhaps the 
clearest case. Democratic politics can only be saved if participation, citizenship 
and the very idea that the quest for political freedom (collective self-determination) 
is a part of human dignity can be brought to life in our age. If we take electoral 
participation as our measure the experience so far is that the already depoliticised 
populations of European nation states are even more difficult to mobilise for active 
53 The stir around the information leaks by Manning and Snowden is however, above all, belated. 
It has been public knowledge since 1988, when Duncan Campbell published his first stories on 
the matter, that the NSA and other intelligence agencies have very comprehensive schemes for 
communications intelligence. “Key findings concerning the state of the art in Communications 
Intelligence include:* Comprehensive systems exist to access, intercept and process every 
important modern form of communications, with few exceptions * Recent diplomatic initiatives by the 
United States government seeking European agreement to the “key escrow” system of cryptography 
masked intelligence collection requirements, and formed part of a long -term program which has 
undermined and continues to undermine the communications privacy of non-US nationals, including 
European governments, companies and citizens* There is wide-ranging evidence indicating that 
major governments are routinely utilising communications intelligence to provide commercial 
advantage to companies and trade.” Quoted from the summary page of <www.duncancampbell.
org/menu/surveillance/echelon/IC2000_Report%20.pdf>. See also <www.duncancampbell.org/
content/echelon> and the report to the European Parliament in 2001: <www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//DA>. 
54 With a focus on the European level, this “revolving door” phenomenon and its consequences 
have been documented in a series of studies by Corporate Europe Observatory. See, for example, 
Eberhardt & Olivet 2012, with contributions from Tyler Amos & Nick Buxton. 
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citizenship at the level of the European Union than at the national or local level. The 
idea that the democracy deficit in the European Union can be fixed just by giving 
more power to the European Parliament is therefore only a delusion as long as the 
European elections do not change character deeply. The question of participation 
is the single most important factor.55 But also the quality of the deliberative process 
in the run-up to the elections is important and quite problematic today, when voting 
behaviour in European elections is often determined on the basis of narrowly 
national perspectives. I conclude from these considerations that we have some 
reason to say that the European Union is indeed our best bet when we seek to 
promote cosmopolitan transnational governance. But if we have nothing better to 
build our dreams for a better future on our prospects for success are bleak indeed.56
(ii) The European Union: Our only hope?
At this point we can, finally, and now without unnecessary romanticism, bring to the 
fore the question of whether Nancy Fraser and others who support the standard 
view are – all things considered – nevertheless right when they suggest that the 
construction of transnational institutions for political governance is the only way if 
we want to tame transnational corporations and that therefore the European Union 
deserves our allegiance. There are two questions here. One question is, if the 
European Union disintegrates, does it follow that “Europe” will no longer be able to 
play a positive role in building transnational governance capacity?
The answer is obviously no: It is easy to imagine other institutional futures 
for regional cooperation in Europe that may carry more and better hopes than 
the current European Union does. Naturally, I share the worry that the more the 
disintegration of the present EU happens through the rise of regressive nationalism 
and a collapse of democracy and cosmopolitan ambition, the greater may be the 
difficulty, at least in the short term, to build something better in its place. However, 
I find it difficult to see why it would follow from this consideration that the loyalty to 
the Union that we de facto have is our only responsible option in political life. I would 
55 The turn-out rates in elections for the European Parliament are generally extremely low, with an 
average last time of only around 40 %. See <pxweb2.stat.fi/Database/Eurostat/vaa/vaa_fi.asp>.
56  In fact, even after the issues I will raise below have been addressed, the best argument 
there isfor investing hope and political energy in the current European Union is the following: “The 
question whether there are any important differences in the democratic quality of the power that 
the major powers in world politics hold is sentimental and unimportant. What the weaker players 
always need is not lofty democratic idealism but a world politics with multiple players. The interests 
of different players will differ and they can then be played out against each other, to the benefit of 
all small countries especially in the global south.” This kind of simple “Hobbesian” argument merits 
serious attention. Nevertheless, it lies beyond the scope of the present essay for the following 
reason: If this is the perspective from which we assess the role of the European Union in world 
politics we are far removed from the optimism about the relevance of normative arguments in real 
politics and from the utopian aspiration that informs the cosmopolitan standard view. In the present 
essay, I confine myself to discussion in which normative ideals, other than survival and self-interest, 
are taken seriously as motivating factors and standards of success in politics.
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rather say that as the risk of regressive collapse grows it becomes increasingly 
urgent for us not to accept loyalty to an ever less legitimate European Union as 
the only alternative for “European” cosmopolitan idealists. A two-prong strategy is 
more attractive. Radical democratisation of the European Union is one prong,57 and 
the other is to gradually work out ideas, programmes and political coalitions that 
look forward to the disintegration of the present European Union and the building 
of a new Europe on cosmopolitan premises. Unless this work is conducted it will 
be even more difficult than otherwise to maintain space for cosmopolitan political 
alternatives after a collapse of the current European Union, if it happens. More 
importantly, I think the rise of authoritarian capitalism can only be countered if 
cosmopolitans refuse the blackmail that our only alternative is this European Union.
The refusal will seem unrealistic and unattractive as long as we fail to ask the 
basic question: Is it true, as presumed in the standard view, that no matter what 
we think about the current state of and future prospects for the European Union 
and about our other pressing political challenges, such as the need to counter 
depoliticisation, that we need post-national political governance of some kind? The 
answer is less obvious than cosmopolitans sometimes think.58
Strategies for post-national governance can have two forms. They can bet on 
the large scale and seek ways forward through enhanced transnational governance 
capacity, with or without the nation states of old in a leading role. We can call 
this the transnationalisation strategy or the move up strategy for post-national 
governance.59 They can also bet on the small scale and seek remedies through the 
dissolution of dependence on transnational markets and corporations. This I will call 
the localisation strategy, or the scale-down strategy, for post-national governance.60 
National protectionism and the socialisation of banks, energy and services may 
be useful intermediate steps the scale-down strategy. It is often perceived as a 
“green” project, rooted intellectually in eco-philosophy and politically linked to the 
Degrowth movement and ecological pessimism. This picture is seriously flawed. 
The real heart of a localisation strategy for post-national governance is the search 
57 See footnote 5 above.
58 Often people who accept the standard view endorse prejudiced views of the nation-states as 
patriotic, exclusive, culturally monolithic, selfish and incapable of learning. But the history of the 
modern nation states is a multiple affair. We have Albania and North Korea, but also many countries 
in which collective learning processes have taken place that cosmopolitans may welcome. It is 
simply not clear that internationally cooperating nations will be less capable than new regional 
entities to take on the pressing challenges of globalised markets, climate change, inter-continental 
migration. For present purposes we may assume, however, that the prospects for successful global 
governance for our times by nation-states are no better than the prospects for success with the help 
of the European Union. If these two are our only alternatives the future looks bleak.
59  See, for example, Held 1995; 2004. Patomäki & Teivainen together with Rönkkö 2002. See also 
Habermas’s blueprint for a cosmopolitan world order: Habermas 2006. 
60 The unrivalled classic in the field is still, Gandhi 1936 (first published in South Africa, in the 
Indian Opinion, in 1908/1909.) See also, for example, Hines 2000, and Pasanen & Ulvila 2009. 
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for self-determination and radical democracy and the promotion of local political 
autonomy and economic self-reliance are means to these ends.61 
As a preview to our discussion of transnationalisation and localisation strategies 
for a post-national world order let us note this: The taming of Transnational 
Corporations and “Too Big To Fails” (TBTFs) and the construction of political 
institutions of high democratic quality is a tough and, perhaps, an impossible 
task within the framework of the transnationalisation strategy. At least the 
empirical record is not encouraging. It therefore seems utopian also to expect that 
transnationalisation will help to solve global ecological problems, at least if minimal 
social standards are also aimed at (see however, our notes on technology below). 
But, if locally self-reliant communities with cosmopolitan aims can be achieved, 
transnational corporations and TBTFs will be no problem at all. They will all simply 
be out of business as no one needs their products or services. Similarly, in a scale-
down framework the governance of global markets will also be simple. The scale 
of exchange between self-reliant communities would be so small as to make most 
formal governance obsolete. The scale of environmental degradation and risk 
is also likely to reduce when local control over technologies and economies is 
achieved. If we ask whether localisation would foster exclusionary chauvinism the 
answer is also clear: there is little reason to expect local communities that are the 
product of democratic, cosmopolitan aspiration to do worse in serving inclusion 
as compared with nation states or the present European Union. All this is simple 
enough.
The critical question for those who want to advance localisation as the main 
strategy towards post-national world politics is, however, also obvious. Is the 
strategy realistic?
I will not respond to this question directly. I have two reasons for not doing 
so. First, putting this question early and abstractly is, it seems to me, often an 
expression of lazy middle-class fear of the obvious consequence: If we pursue 
the localisation strategy it may mean the end of the consumerist life-style. While it 
may be true that it is difficult to galvanise the support of the consuming classes for 
such a shift in ambition it may be sobering for our political imagination to consider 
this observation in the light of two further ones. One is that in the name of realism 
we need to admit that the consumerist life-style as a life-style available to the 
many may be coming to its end rather soon, whether people choose the ending 
voluntarily or not.62 The other is that, in the name of a free cultural imagination, we 
should consider the possibility that the end of consumerist life can be the beginning 
of the emancipation of a significant proportion of humanity from the opaque and 
61 For some arguments, see Wallgren 2012. 
62 For one recent assessment of the long-term viability on a global scale of the present-day 
“American”, consumerist form of life see Barnosky 2012. For recent discussion of the feasability and 
promise of liberation inherent in the scale-down strategy, see, for example, the materials presented 
at the third international conference on degrowth, available at <www.venezia2012.it> (accessed 4th 
Dec, 2012).
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problematic role it, the well-offs of our time, plays in anonymous exploitation and 
exclusionary practices (Johan Galtung’s coining of the term “structural violence” was 
an early effort to conceptualise the kind of problem and promise of emancipation 
that I point to here).63 
The second, more pressing and immediate reason for not discussing the 
““realistic” prospects for success through the localisation strategy here is that 
such a discussion would preclude attention to another, more urgent question. The 
question we need to ask before we ask whether the localisation strategy is realistic 
is whether the transnationalisation strategy is realistic. In this case, too, the answers 
we need cannot be given in the abstract. I turn, therefore, to a discussion of four 
topics that we must consider in this respect. The topics are huge and the discussion 
will be short. Nevertheless, what follows suffices, it seems to me, to establish that 
it is not at all clear that the transnationalisation strategy for a cosmopolitan post-
national politics holds a more realistic, and in this sense better, promise for our 
present predicament than does the localisation strategy.
5.4. Transnational postnationalism: The only alternative or a false utopia?
We have seen above that it is not easy for cosmopolitans to invest their hopes 
and political energy in the European Union. We have also seen that if we want 
to respond to the needs of our times by enhancing the capacity for transnational 
governance – or if we think (courageously?) that it is a question of duty to do so 
(because integration is unstoppable?) – the European Union may, unfortunately, 
nevertheless be our best bet.
Now, if our best hope is no better than this, maybe it is high time for us to turn 
the axis of our political analysis around and inquire critically into the premises that 
underwrite the standard view. I will consider four such premises. Each of them 
works as a mostly unacknowledged foundation for the preconception shared by 
many cosmopolitans that the transnational strategy for post-nationalism is a more 
promising and, above all, a more natural, political strategy for cosmopolitans than 
localisation.
i) The myth of replicable success
There is the myth of easily attainable success, which has many supporters among 
cosmopolitans. According to this myth, we basically already know what we need 
to do. In the past we, the happy citizens of the democratic welfare states, tamed 
capitalism at the national level. Our task in the 21st century is to repeat the miracle 
63 Galtung 1969.
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of the 20th century, only on a grander scale. The myth lends itself to political slogans 
such as “global problems require global solutions.” Here are some objections.
a) The myth builds on a false understanding of the history of the welfare state. 
Its material condition of success was always the exploitation of the South and 
the externalisation of ecological costs. Hence, the global realisation of the welfare 
state is only possible if all people can join it without transgressing ecological limits.
Is this objection to the replicable success -idea valid? The issue is complex. 
Theoretically there are no objective limits to growth. We can always hope that with 
new breakthroughs in science and technology and improved governance we can 
take care of biodiversity, ecological long-term stability and material abundance for 
all. The search for paths to sustainable development and green growth epitomise 
efforts to make this theory work. Unfortunately these efforts have so far not been 
crowned with success. Whatever hopeful theory tells us, the negative relation 
between economic growth and environmental degradation has so far not been 
broken anywhere. If empirical evidence matters the suspicion grows that all talk of 
sustainable growth is just an expression of wishful thinking and false opportunism. 
The point is not that we know that the ‘limits to growth’ thesis is basically true. The 
point is that in the light of our experience so far it seems that the risks and the 
uncertainties that we take responsibility for if and when we seek to tame capitalism 
through the construction of a global welfare state modelled on the experience of, 
for example, the Nordic countries in the previous century are truly enormous and 
grow by the day.64 It seems, therefore, that prudence requires that we give up the 
dream of sustainable growth globally. This we may call the “ecological argument” 
against the myth of replicable success. 
b) The political condition for the welfare state compromise of the 20th century 
was, it seems to me, the struggle of mass-based social movements, especially the 
workers’ and the feminist movements, success in unionising and success in the 
political mobilisation and organisation of the left parties. In none of these respects 
are we anywhere near developing transnational or global political tools that would 
in their relative strength be appropriate to our task. Hence the political conditions 
for a repetition at the transnational level of the national welfare state compromises 
of the past century seem like a distant dream only. This we may call the “political 
condition argument against the myth of replicable success.
It might be said that the difficulties I point to only give us more reason than 
before to roll up our sleeves and to work even harder to make our transnational 
political response more effective than before. I repeat my question: Is this reaction 
not premature unless we have first considered the possibility that the unthinking 
commitment to the transnationalisation strategy from which such a response almost 
mechanically flows is irresponsibly utopian and dooms us to an ever deepening 
complicity in planetary destruction?
64 For some arguments, see my “Some Remarks on the Brundtland Report” - Lokayan Bulletin 
(Delhi, India) 2/90, pp. 21–33.
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ii) The conceit of expansivism 
A basic presupposition of the standard cosmopolitan vision is its inadvertent 
optimism about the compatibility of large-scale political organisation with solidarity 
and democracy. Even among those who consider public debate and deliberation to 
be central to democracy and who acknowledge the practical difficulty of realising 
post-national deliberative democracies, more effort usually goes into envisaging 
solutions, no matter how unrealistic they are today, and into tracing weak signals 
of progress than to critical study of past experience or sober reflections on the 
weaknesses of the propositions.65 One reason is that, just as in the case of the 
theories of peace, in the context of democratic theory as well, the challenge of 
technology is rarely discussed. I will soon come back to that. A more surprising 
lacuna that informs the optimism of the standard vision is the following: The rational 
engagement of the citizens is a condition for democracy as a practice of freedom. 
The rationality requirement has two dimensions, one is procedural, the other 
substantial. On the procedural side, transnational cosmopolitan strategies need 
to ask how much complexity we can master if we want to regulate and design 
rationally the dialogue between equal citizens and also the relation between the 
citizens, their elected representatives and experts. On the substantial side, the 
critical question we need to ask is how much complexity we can have in relations 
between citizens and also in the interaction between people and the environment 
without placing a burden on the citizens’ time, intellectual capacities and moral 
imagination that no one can carry. 
The deepest problem in this field has to do with the motivational and rational 
conditions for solidarity in abstract and indirect relations. It is easy enough to be 
convinced by and sign up to the basic ethical principles of universalism. But there 
seems to be a structural difference between the force of moral motives in relations 
between people who interact closely and the force of the motives that can move 
us to solidarity with the “remote others“. It is of course a central task of politics 
and law in complex societies to create conditions for practices that would allow us 
to realise cosmopolitan ideals despite the motivational gap that in such societies 
makes overview, decency and moral self-understanding difficult. The question is, 
however, how well we think the task can be accomplished.
The links between the challenges to democracy and to solidarity in the 
transnational strategy for cosmopolitanism are intimate. Bridging the motivational 
gap indirectly, through political self-determination, is necessary for global solidarity. 
But understanding is also a requirement and the understanding needs to be 
65 Theorising about post-national and global democracy has probably, together with evolutionary 
social science, been the biggest career-making topic for the generation of social and political 
scientists that is now in power inWestern academia. On my bookshelf, Anthony Giddens, David 
Held and Zygmunt Bauman stick out as some of the influential voices in this successful field. My 
sarcasm about the “tracing of weak signals” is triggered in particular by the opening remarks of the 
joint piece by Derrida and Habermas referred to above. See also, for example, Sen, Anand, Escobar 
& Waterman 2004 and Sehm-Patomäki & Ulvila 2007.
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anchored both in empirical facts and in access to the interpretations by remote 
others, especially by those who are most vulnerable and seriously affected, In order 
to achieve unsentimental understanding and informed practices we would need 
effective communicative procedures with a global reach that grant fair and equal 
access to all in deliberative practices.66 A lot of fine work has been done since the 
first meetings in the 19th century of the socialist internationals and the international 
feminist movement to create institutions and practices for such procedures. A lot 
of sophisticated theoretical work has also been done to provide normative and 
practical orientation for modern politics aiming at globally integrated democratic 
governance. But again, the challenging question that we have pushed aside for 
too long is the one about the balance between what we have aspired to achieve, 
the “global village” or the “weltbürgerliche Zustand” (Kant), and what the historical 
record tells us. And, again, there is the underlying question how long it is right to 
remain loyal to the transnationalist programme for cosmopolitan politics in the face 
of its empirical failures.
The questions are difficult. In this context I cannot help that I find myself thinking 
that Gandhi has something to tell us, something that we may not find easy to place 
in the routines of our debates, and that we may therefore dismiss all too lightly, 
when he writes in November 1908, aboard the Kildonan Castle: 
We have already considered the railways. I should, however, like to add that man is 
so made by nature as to require him to restrict his movements as far as his hands and 
feet will take him. If we did not rush from place to place by means of railways and other 
such maddening conveniences, much of the confusion that arises would be obviated. 
Our difficulties are of our own creation. . . . I am so constructed that I can only serve 
my immediate neighbours, but, in my conceit, I pretend to have discovered that I must 
with my body serve every individual in the Universe. In thus attempting the impossible, 
man is . . . utterly confounded. According to this reasoning, it must be apparent to you 
that railways are a most dangerous institution.67
Gandhi was probably committed as much as anyone to cosmopolitan ideals.68 
Nevertheless, his words may strike us as out of touch with reality, at least with the 
66 My very clear impression from many personal encounters and discussion, for example,. in the 
World Social Forum framework, is that efforts by the super-rich, epitomised most visibly in the 
foundations set up in their names, to use their wealth to promote cosmopolitanism, strike most 
cosmopolitan activists and intellectuals as, at best, sentimental and pathetic, especially when they 
live in the global South.
67 There are many features of this key passage from Gandhi’s early pamphlet, the Hind Swaraj that 
are bound to strike contemporary secular readers as backward and naive. Such reactions should 
not stand in the way of appreciating the urgency of Gandhi’s challenge. I have used the translation 
by Sharma and Tripid in Sharma & Suhrud 2010, here p. 44.
68 At least to its ethical core, the dignity and well-being of all and special concern for the 
dispossessed and underprivileged. For this, see, for example, Gandhi’s “Talisman”, available, for 
example, at p. 609 in Iyer 1987. The Talisman is both problematic and enigmatic. The much needed 
and popular discussion of Gandhi’s political failures and moral limitations should not blind us to his 
achievements and innovations e.g. in synthesising Emersonian perfectionism with political efficacy 
based on mass-mobilisation or in the redefinition of search for truth and salvation as the practice of 
satyagraha.
Dictatorship of Failure
288
reality of our times. Perhaps we say: In Gandhi’s times railways were still new. 
Perhaps life without them would then still have been possible, maybe even a 
realistic path for India of his time? But now, a hundred years later Gandhi’s “luddite” 
ideals are quite impossible. If this is what we think, our dismissal of Gandhi bears, 
of course, the mark of the passing of history. One century that was the future for 
Gandhi and his times is the past for us. Thanks to fantastic ingenuity and effort the 
“railways” (modern technology), and also the “doctors“ and “lawyers” that Gandhi 
made short shrift of in the Hind Swaraj, have been integrated into the web of life of 
all peoples and have changed the face of the planet. That is what we have seen. In 
a material, everyday sense, surely our habits and practices today are much further 
removed from a life without railways than in Gandhi‘s times. Achieving liberation 
from our dependencies through deliberation and choice is a remote possibility, at 
least for more than a few marginal small communities. And therefore it may easily 
appear to us that Gandhi’s criticism of any reliance on technical mediation in efforts 
to realise solidarity beyond the local realm, is for us of historical interest only. Let 
us pause to ask: Is this all we need to say about Gandhi’s criticism of technology 
and institutional complexity?
The question presents a peculiar difficulty for us because it is the converging 
point of one undecided and vocal debate and another debate, also undecided but 
strangely muted.
The vocal debate is the one about progress. When Gandhi wrote the Hind 
Swaraj progressivism was the dominant mood: Most people agreed that the present 
age was a troubled one, but also that the right choices and the right struggles 
could bring us a brighter tomorrow. Today there is disagreement over the present. 
Brutal poverty and oppression remain widespread. Nevertheless, at least among 
the better-offs many would say that we have progressed and that today is really, all 
things considered, the best of times. At the same time optimism about the future 
has become rarer, uncertainty looms large and pessimistic forecasts are common.
The muted debate is the one about freedom in history. A century ago the modern 
notion of politics, according to which people acting together can shape the future in 
the image of their ideals, was still a relatively newly won and hugely inspiring one. 
History was seen as an arena of choice, struggle, freedom and responsibility. Mass-
based social movements throughout the world that drew their energy and sense 
of mission from this conception emerged and history did change. For Gandhi, too, 
this experience and conception of history and of man’s place in it played a large 
role. 
 The same notion that politics is collective, wilful control over future life-
conditions, has made itself felt in the recent Latin American turn to the left and again 
in 2011, in Tahir Square. I have no doubt that this modern idea of emancipatory 
politics is also present daily as a real force in people’s struggles in other less 
symbolic places. My sense is, however, that the wings of the dream of freedom 
have been clipped: as the violence in Syria continues and developments in Egypt 
are bleak, and as Evo Morales struggles to find the right balance between the 
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development demands coming from the peasants and workers who constitute his 
mass-base and the ecological and cultural demands of his smaller indigenous and 
green supporters, the resurgence of modern trust in the possibility of politics typical 
of the early 20th century looks more vulnerable than ever. This takes me to my next 
topic.
iii) Developmentalism
I claimed above that for many cosmopolitans the transnationalist strategy appears 
more natural than the localisation strategy. One explanatory factor is that we live in 
the grips of a particular, modernist view of historical time and of man’s role in it. We 
can call this view developmentalism. Developmentalism can mean many things. 
Here are some aspects of the semantic potential of the concept and its detrimental 
political effects today.
One aspect is the idea that the things that have happened in the modern West 
represent universal models. This idea has been under attack for many years. Human 
rights, individualism and secularism have been targeted so often that one might 
almost get the impression that the modern West no longer dominates imaginations 
of the future in mainstream discussion among cosmopolitans about possible paths 
of development. That would however be a half-truth at best. The critique of Western 
hegemonisation of universalism has been selective and the routine assumption is 
still that civilisational breakthroughs coming from Europe and the USA, not from 
Russia, Somalia, China or Ecuador, are the true makers of the future. Otherwise we 
can hardly explain the gap between what happens before our eyes – the European 
Union sinks into a condition of post-democracy and authoritarian capitalism – and 
what many still like to say: that the European Union provides a globally pioneering 
model for post-national, democratic institution-building (see discussion above). 
The controlling influence that the legacy of Western modernity continues to hold 
over social and political imagination globally has, it seems to me, its deepest roots 
still in the notion that the intimate connection between modern natural science 
and technology is morally unproblematic and can serve emancipation and human 
dignity under varying political and cultural conditions. At least in most contemporary 
post-colonial discourse that I am aware of the kind of technology developed in the 
modern West during recent centuries tends to remain accepted as an unquestionably 
universalisable aspect of an otherwise often harshly criticised legacy of the West.69
A closely related aspect of developmentalism is the “we can’t go back”-idea. It 
is a strange idea for many reasons. My main objection is the utter lack of clarity 
69 In the vast field of criticism of development and postcolonial studies one does occasionally 
come across studies that are not selective in their theorising of developmentalism in the way I here 
criticise. One example is Illich 1973. In the 19th century, and still a century ago, the discursive 
landscape was quite different, with people like Ruskin, Tolstoy, Thoreau and Gandhi as visible 
figures in the debate about development alternatives. See also Sachs 1992; Nandy 1983; Kothari 
1988; Mignolo 2000 and Escobar 1995.
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of what people mean when they say, for instance, that life-forms of old times can 
not be brought back and practised again. Often, when people say that “we can’t 
go back” it is not clear what perspective is suggested e.g. on real events that bring 
people, whether out of necessity or choice to engage in practices, that have been 
set aside that have been rare for longer or shorter times. 
Nevertheless, the basic problem with the “we can’t go back -idea” is the enormous 
tension between it and the idea of political freedom as self-determination, referred 
to above: If history is pre-determined at least in the (obscure and undefined) sense 
of “there is no going back” to earlier ways of life, values, practices or technologies, 
then all that is left to us of the high modern idea of politics as freedom in history, 
is what Marx described in the 1867 Preface to his Capital. Our freedom in history 
consists, according to this Preface, at best, in “shortening and mildening the birth 
pangs” of inevitable historical development.70 In the case of Marx, the tension 
between the historical determinism of the 1867 Preface and his political activism 
is a wound open for all to see. By contrast, when the idea that “we can’t go back” 
is invoked in debates about the European Union or, to take another example, 
about capital controls, its usual place is not in reflective debate about history or 
the philosophy of history, politics and citizenship. Its function is, rather, that of a 
conversation stopper in public debate about current policy options: It is used as a 
tool used to curb “anti-European nationalism” or “anti-globalisation” mobilisation by 
presenting these as undesirable (because regressive) and as unrealistic (because 
based on impossible, infantile fantasies). It is also used as a tool to marginalise 
suggestions that capital controls (or e.g. protectionist trade policies) be introduced. 
In these and many other similar contexts the “we can’t go back idea” has no 
intellectual content. Its only function is to defend the status quo against political 
alternatives
iv) The failure to politicise technology
In many places above, I have mentioned the question of technology in passing. A 
mystification of technology seems to me to be, together with expansivist conceit, 
the deepest reason for the popularity of the transnationalist strategy for postnational 
politics among cosmopolitans.
To clarify this point let us look at the disquieting imbalance between the political 
discourse of economy and that of technology. During the past decades it has been 
popular among left-leaning academics to criticise the de-politicisation of economics. 
We all know the kind of experience that feeds the debate. It is when so-and-so, who 
is the chief economic adviser of such-and-such or the prime minister of X informs 
his board or the general public that for the city of Manchester or the government 
of Tanzania or Portugal there is no alternative to, say, tight budget discipline and, 
70 Marx 1973, quote from p. 16. My translation.
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hence, no alternative to the selling of public property, the down-scaling of public 
expenses relative to GDP, cuts in unemployment benefits etc.
Nevertheless, we must be clear that for this kind of experience cosmopolitans 
have had for many years a clear concept. We call this TINA-politics.71 Where there 
is a concept there is awareness and where there is awareness there is political 
debate and struggle. What we see, therefore, is the paradox that we have a mass 
movement of activists and academics who build agendas, careers, identities and 
solidarities on their common agreement that they address politically the lack of 
political debate about the economy. In consequence, nothing is more politicised 
today than economic policy, and yet we say that it is not politicised. 
Take recent political developments in the EU as one example. The problem for 
left and liberal intellectuals and cosmopolitan activists is not that the economy is 
not seen as political. Politicians listen to the wrong economic adviser, that is the 
problem. The fact that the advisers who are listened to like to dress up as neutral 
and unpolitical experts is unmasked as a political trick every day. Why then do 
people insist that our problem is TINA-politics in the economic realm?
My suggestion is that we like to continue the intensely political debate about the 
lack of political debate about the economy partly in order to hide from view – from 
ourselves and from others – that we fear what will happen to us if we start barking 
up the much taller tree of technology. We are afraid of the subject of technology 
as a topic for critical attention in political analysis and action. We are afraid of 
it because we seem to know in advance that if we begin to discuss technology 
honestly, the implications for what we can hope, and what we must do, will be 
more radical than we have the courage to even think of. Nietzsche captured the 
problem social-liberal, left and green cosmopolitans have with debating technology 
well when he speaks about people “wanting not to see something one does see, 
wanting not to see something one sees as one sees it is”(AC §55).
Even though we often seem to forget it, we are all well aware that a hundred 
years back criticism of technical progress was an important aspect of radical 
modernism, and not only for Tolstoy and Gandhi. We also know that this was only 
part of the picture. In those days extreme technological optimism also flowered. 
This was true among liberal and socialist radicals and also in aesthetic movements 
such as in the futurist avant-gardism of Filippo Marinetti. What we learn from these 
reminders is simple: A century ago critical discussion of the relation between 
modern technology and emancipation was a natural topic of debate within what I 
call the cosmopolitan family.
Today the discursive landscape has changed. Technology remains a focal point 
of public attention, but the centre of gravity has shifted from the political arena to 
that of advertising, marketing, and to science fiction and scientism. In cartoons and 
popular science magazines, utopian and, more frequently, dystopian visions of how 
new technology will change our circumstance are as common as rain. In the trams 
71 See footnote 28 above.
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and metros people will speak with a mixed sense of curiosity, awe and excitement 
about a future where human brains are integrated with computers and wonder how 
that will change our notions of self and society. But in politics technological choices 
and the moral change and social responsibility they bring with them is a marginal 
topic. To the extent that technology becomes a topic at all the debates typically focus 
narrowly either on risks connected to technical applications of recent advances in 
bioscience, with genetic modification as the most popular topic, or on corporate 
power in technology governance, as in the “open access” movement. Other topics, 
and, hence, of course also the general question of which technologies can and 
cannot serve cosmopolitan purposes, remain marginal.
To back this claim let me give just one illustration of how the debate goes – 
or rather, of how it does not go. In the 1980s, the Norwegian eco-philosopher 
Sigmund Kvalöy, himself a pioneer in computer-aided design and music in the early 
1960s, suggested that computers, satellites and the internet are dependent on an 
extreme division of labour and the large-scale extraction of rare earth metals, that 
this division of labour and these extraction practices may be incompatible with 
ecological democracy, and that for these reasons alone, we should suspect that any 
economy and social organisation that assumes that we will be able to continue to 
use computers or cell-phones, is incompatible with cosmopolitan idealism. Kvalöy’s 
argument and others of the kind are important. It argues among other things that 
we have rarely considered the challenge to democracy and solidarity that follows 
as long as the technical devices that we are dependent on in our daily lives can only 
function as long as a large number of people must be educated and socialised into 
the role of experts in narrow fields whose capacity to understand their citizenship 
is often weak.72 Again, the problem is empirical and practical rather than abstract 
and theoretical. It is conceivable that socialisation into responsible citizenship and 
global solidarity is achievable in a system of education that secures reproduction of 
very many different kinds of experts. It is conceivable that we have dependency by 
everyone on cheap rare earth metals that are required to keep computer screens 
working in a world where decent work is available for all and dangerous mining 
practices no longer exist. It is also conceivable that new technologies that are now 
on our doorsteps, such as technologies that make genetic manipulation of micro-
72  Kvalöy’s argument brings together two strands in the history of the philosophical discourse of 
modernity. One is the criticism of the division of labour that goes back in particular to Rousseau, 
another is the criticism of extraction technologies and pollution that has been criticised on ethical, 
aesthetic and cosmological grounds long before the ‘limits-to-growth’ debates. I am familiar with 
Kvalöy’s argument primarily through public lectures he gave in Helsinki and Juva, Finland, in the 
mid- and late 1980s. For some printed sources, see Kvaløy 1976 and 1992. Interestingly, in the 
so-called deep ecology movement in the anglophone world, in which Norwegian eco-philosophy 
is respected and often mentioned as a source of inspiration, the critique of technology has, if I see 
things rightly here, attracted less attention than discussion of animal rights (inspired by Peter Singer 
and others), or other ethical, epistemological and ontological issues (as articulated by ecofeminists, 
by Kvaløy’s Norwegian colleague Arne Naess and by others). From the perspective of our present 
discussion it is striking that the more popular topics in the deep ecology debate all pretty easily lend 
themselves to progressivist language. When people say “we can move from smaller to larger circles 
of solidarity or awareness and from more to less restricted moral reasoning and identities” we see 
the developmentalist view of history doing its silent work.
Wallgren
293
organisms or market trade in human genes or cloning of people easily accessible, 
will be used in ways which remain under enlightened, democratic control and with 
a keen attention to unintended consequences. All this is conceivable – but, as 
I believe we can say in the light of the experience of past centuries – it is also 
extremely unlikely to happen.
It may seem, nevertheless, clear why the question of technology has disappeared 
from political debates. So overwhelming has been the power of technology to 
transform our everyday social and cultural habits, our relation to nature and our 
relation to self, and so strong the aura of new technologies, that we almost forget 
that technological development is the result of choice. This forgetfulness explains, 
we may think, the lack of political attention to the question of technology today.
Once more, however, the explanation is likely to strike us as absurd as soon 
as it is made explicit: We have put a lot of money, organisational skill and political 
prestige into technical development. Millions of people have also invested a lot of 
personal effort in it. It takes a fantastic effort every day to keep the wheels spinning. 
How can we forget that? If the technological development we see is only possible 
as a consequence of massive investment, commitment and concerted action, a 
change of course is also positive, if that is what we decide.
And how can we forget (or how can we claim that we forget) that natural 
catastrophes, such as a massive Carrington event, could bring the satellites and 
the internet down in a short time.73 Are we not, in fact, often reminded that quite 
simple terrorist attacks targeted at infrastructure could achieve the same as a 
Carrington event? Nevertheless, technological development on the whole appears 
to us almost like an unstoppable force of nature. 
One reason for the co-existence of these two incompatible notions – the notion 
that technological development is vulnerable and the result of choice, and the notion 
that technological development seems more like a matter of fate than of choice – 
may be that the enormity of the dependence of most of us, for our daily routines 
and our bare survival, on technologies beyond our control, makes us nervous. It 
is almost as if we had asked ourselves and others: “Can we get of out our current 
dependence on the satellite, penicillin, high energy consumption, the railway ,etc.” 
And almost as if we had answered with a carefully considered “No.” It is almost like 
that. And yet, it is not quite like that.
If there had been a dialogue, the technology question would not make us 
nervous. It would be one question among others that we are quite willing to take 
on, even though, perhaps, we are worried that we will be a bit bored by the need 
to restate the obvious. But we are not bored. We are blind and nervous. Or rather, 
we are blinded by our fear.
Am I suggesting that in Europe and elsewhere the discussion of progress among 
cosmopolitans gets muted and our sense of political freedom gets crippled by a 
73 See, for example, <www.raeng.org.uk/news/publications/list/Space_Weather_Full_Report_
Final.PDF> (accessed June 5, 2013).
Dictatorship of Failure
294
sense of helplessness in the face of technology and, hence, of historical fatalism? 
Am I also, then, suggesting that, possibly, cosmopolitan ideals can only bend 
political responses to the so-called euro-crisis in new and promising directions 
if this fatalism is overcome? Am I suggesting, thirdly, that the failure to address 
the question of technology as a political issue lies at the heart of the standard 
view and is a major reason for the popularity of the transnationalist strategy for 
cosmopolitanism? Am I suggesting, fourthly, in the light of all this, that the failure 
to discuss technology critically is a major and blatantly irrational condition for the 
popularity of the standard view? And am I suggesting, finally, that the failure to 
discuss technology is one root cause of the unfounded optimism about and loyalty 
to the current European Union that afflicts the cosmopolitan family today. Indeed, 
I wish to suggest all of the foregoing. All these points are of course controversial 
and taken together they may seem almost ridiculous. I am also not unaware of 
the fact that when critical theorists last debated technology the “reformists”, who 
wanted to tame the deadly power of unbound instrumental reason and its technical 
realisation, had the better of the argument in their debate with pessimistic fatalists 
(such as Spengler or Adorno) or luddite optimists.74 Moreover, it is clear to me 
that the questioning of technology, which has come from “anti-modern” sources 
as diverse as Thoreau, Spengler and Heidegger, has not been able to deal well 
with the question of the sources for the validation of this criticism. I nevertheless 
submit the proposition that if cosmopolitans wish to be clear about their strategies, 
they need to place the question of technology high on their agenda in political 
philosophy and activism. 
VI. Political strategy, solidarity and 
hope for cosmopolitans
It is time to sum up. I have had one main concern: To explain why it seems to me 
to that many cosmopolitans are lured by their commitment to what I have called 
“the standard view” and “the transnationalist strategy for post-national political 
governance” to be more loyal to and less critical of the European Union as it is 
today than is rational. In order to make myself understood, I have covered a large 
number of topics and painted my landscape with a broad brush.
My purpose has not been to say how things are or what the right perspective on 
them is. In a way, my purpose has been much more ambitious than that. The purpose 
has been to bring home a huge message to those of my fellow cosmopolitans who 
think localisation strategies for post-national governance are unrealistic, silly and 
irresponsible. My message is that as long as the issues I have raised are not 
74 See, for example, Habermas 1982. For references to the debates on technology in the Left-
Hegelian tradition of critical theory up to the mid 1980s, see my review article Wallgren 2004.
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brought into our discussion, there will be no end in sight to the complicity of the 
majority of cosmopolitans with the drift towards authoritarian capitalism in Europe.
It is important to see what I am not suggesting. I do not suggest that 
cosmopolitans give up the struggle to achieve a democratic European Union that 
serves social justice and ecological responsibility at all levels. I do not even suggest 
that cosmopolitans are, in any straightforward way, wrong if they continue to insist 
that this project, perhaps as the regional expression of a large, planetary struggle 
for the creation of a transnationalist post-national cosmopolitan order, is our best 
or only hope. What I do suggest is that cosmopolitans of this bent should strive to 
be humble enough to debate with and stand in solidarity with other cosmopolitans 
who put their effort into what I have called the localisation strategy for post-national 
governance.
The political challenges we face in the European Union and globally are colossal. 
I will not be surprised if history will crush, terribly, the optimism of believers in the 
capacity of markets, science, technology and transnationalist cosmopolitanism to 
solve the problems of our times and if a humanity much reduced in number will 
within a few centuries find itself confined to a localism borne not out of choice but 
of necessity. Such forced localisation may, at least in the beginning, be a horrible 
time.75 But all this is fantasy and we are, still, quite incapable of predicting the future. 
Better then to try to struggle and learn. I will give the last words to Habermas, 
whose many concrete judgements about recent European politics I have criticised 
above, but whose engagement and breadth and acuteness of analysis I still find 
more useful and admirable than most:
Even in established democracies, the existing institutions of freedom are no longer 
above challenge, although here the populations seem to press for more democracy 
rather than less. I suspect, however, that the unrest has a still deeper source, namely, 
the sense that in the age of a completely secularized politics, the rule of law cannot 
be had or maintained without radical democracy. The present investigation aims to 
work this hunch into an insight. In the final analysis, private legal subjects cannot come 
to enjoy equal individual liberties if they do not themselves, in the common exercise 
of their political autonomy, achieve clarity about justified interests and standards. . 
. . I have no illusions about the problems that our situation poses and the moods it 
evokes. But moods –- and philosophies in a melancholic “mood” – do not justify the 
defeatist surrender of the radical content of democratic ideals. . . .  If defeatism were 
justified, I would have had to choose a different literary genre, for example, the diary of 
a Hellenistic writer who merely documents, for subsequent generations, the unfulfilled 
promises of his waning culture.76
75 For one forceful imagination of such a future, see Lessing’s 1982.
76 Habermas 1996.
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